Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation
We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile-to-mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, 'collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Mohrenstraße 58, D-10117 Berlin|
Web page: http://www.diw.de/en
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Neven, D. & Thisse, J-F., 1989. "On Quality And Variety Competition," CORE Discussion Papers 1989020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Poletti, Steve & Wright, Julian, 2003.
"Network Interconnection with Participation Constraints,"
211, Department of Economics, The University of Auckland.
- Poletti, Stephen & Wright, Julian, 2004. "Network interconnection with participation constraints," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 347-373, September.
- Economides, Nicholas, 1996.
"Network externalities, complementarities, and invitations to enter,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 211-233, September.
- Nicholas Economides, 1997. "Network Externalities, Complementarities, and Invitations to Enter," Industrial Organization 9701004, EconWPA.
- Marcel Canoy & Martin Peitz, 1997.
"The differentiation triangle,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
1997-15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 38-56, Spring.
- Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl & Vagstad, Steinar, 2008. "Why is on-net traffic cheaper than off-net traffic Access markup as a collusive device," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 99-115, January.
- Tommaso Valletti & George Houpis, 2005. "Mobile Termination: What is the “Right” Charge?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 235-258, November.
- Gans, J.S. & King, S.P., 2000.
"Mobile Network Competition, Customer Ignorance and Fixed-to-Mobile Call Prices,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
734, The University of Melbourne.
- Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2000. "Mobile network competition, customer ignorance and fixed-to-mobile call prices," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 301-327, December.
- Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2003. "Network competition with price discrimination: 'bill-and-keep' is not so bad after all," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 205-213, November.
- Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2001.
"Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition,"
Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 413-420, June.
- Gans, J.S. & King, S.P., 2000. "Using 'Bill and Keep' Interconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competiti on," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 739, The University of Melbourne.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp500. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bibliothek)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.