Gov-arrrgh-nance: Jolly Rogers and Dodgy Rulers
In this paper, we argue that the effect of governance on the emergence of crimes of different levels of sophistication is highly non-linear. State failure, anarchy and a lack of infrastructure are not conducive to establishing any business, including illicit enterprises. At the bottom of the spectrum, therefore, both legal business and criminal gangs benefit from improved governance. With further improvements in governance criminal activities decline. We find strong and consistent support for this hypothesis using the International Maritime Bureau's dataset on piracy. Piracy is reported by ship-owners, giving a unique insight into crime in badly governed countries which were systematically excluded from previous analyses. We show that profitable forms of piracy flourish where on the one hand there is stability and infrastructure, but on the other hand the state does not have the capacity to intervene and/or bureaucrats can be bribed to turn a blind eye. For minor acts of theft from ships the pattern is quadratic: piracy first rises and then falls as governance improves.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Mohrenstraße 58, D-10117 Berlin|
Web page: http://www.diw.de/en
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Chang, Roberto & Kaltani, Linda & Loayza, Norman, 2005.
"Openness can be good for growth : the role of policy complementarities,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3763, The World Bank.
- Chang, Roberto & Kaltani, Linda & Loayza, Norman V., 2009. "Openness can be good for growth: The role of policy complementarities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 33-49, September.
- Roberto Chang, & Linda Kaltani & Norman Loayza, 2006. "Openness Can be Good for Growth: The Role of Policy Complementarities," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 373, Central Bank of Chile.
- Roberto Chang & Linda Kaltani & Norman Loayza, 2005. "Openness can be good for Growth: The Role of Policy Complementarities," DEGIT Conference Papers c010_021, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Roberto Chang & Linda Kaltani & Norman Loayza, 2005. "Openness Can be Good for Growth: The Role of Policy Complementarities," NBER Working Papers 11787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008.
"Gotcha! A Profile of Smuggling in International Trade,"
DEGIT Conference Papers
c013_026, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Gotcha! A Profile of Smuggling in International Trade," CESifo Working Paper Series 2475, CESifo Group Munich.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker, 2008. "Gotcha! A profile of smuggling in international trade," Discussion Papers 2008/6, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Yoshiaki Azuma & Herschel I. Grossman, 2008.
"A Theory Of The Informal Sector,"
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 62-79, 03.
- Soares, Rodrigo R, 2004. "Crime Reporting as a Measure of Institutional Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 851-871, July.
- Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, 2009.
"The Smuggling of Art, and the Art of Smuggling: Uncovering the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property and Antiques,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
American Economic Association, vol. 1(3), pages 82-96, July.
- Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, 2007. "The Smuggling of Art, and the Art of Smuggling: Uncovering the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property and Antiques," NBER Working Papers 13446, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paolo Buonanno, 2003. "The Socioeconomic Determinants of Crime. A Review of the Literature," Working Papers 63, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2003.
- Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
- Laurent Weill, 2009.
"Does Corruption Hamper Bank Lending? Macro and Micro Evidence,"
Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center
2009-09, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
- Laurent Weill, 2011. "Does corruption hamper bank lending? Macro and micro evidence," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 25-42, August.
- Weill, Laurent, 2009. "Does corruption hamper bank lending? : macro and micro evidence," BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2009, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diweos:diweos39. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bibliothek)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.