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Gov-Aargh-Nance – “even Criminals Need Law And Order”

Author

Listed:
  • Olaf J. de Groot

    (DIW Berlin)

  • Matthew D. Rablen

    (Brunel University)

  • Anja Shortland

    (Brunel University)

Abstract

We present a theoretical model postulating that the relationship between crime and governance is “hump-shaped”, rather than linearly decreasing, when criminals need access to markets. State collapse, violent conflict and a lack of infrastructure are not conducive for the establishment of any business, legal or illegal. At the bottom end of the spectrum, therefore, criminal gangs benefit from improved governance, especially when this is delivered informally. With significant improvements in formal governance criminal activities decline. We use data from the International Maritime Bureau to create a new dataset on piracy and find strong and consistent support for this non-linear relationship.

Suggested Citation

  • Olaf J. de Groot & Matthew D. Rablen & Anja Shortland, 2011. "Gov-Aargh-Nance ‚Äì ‚Äúeven Criminals Need Law And Order‚Äù," NEPS Working Papers 7/2011, Network of European Peace Scientists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:nepswp:2011_007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jablonski, Ryan S. & Oliver, Steven & Hastings, Justin V., 2017. "The Tortuga disease: the perverse effects of illicit foreign capital," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67105, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Ursula E. Daxecker & Brandon C. Prins, 2015. "Searching for Sanctuary: Government Power and the Location of Maritime Piracy," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(4), pages 699-717, August.

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    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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