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Gouvernance interne et investissement en R&D : une comparaison internationale

Author

Listed:
  • Rim Zouari-Hadiji

    () (FSEG Sfax, COFFIT)

  • Ghazi Zouari

    (Fseg Sfax, LEG-Fargo)

Abstract

(VF)Dans le cadre théorique du gouvernement des entreprises, cet article étudie l’efficacité du contrôle exercé par la structure de propriété et le conseil d’administration sur les dirigeants afin de privilégier les investissements en R&D. Cette efficacité est sensible aux modèles nationaux de gouvernance. Les tests réalisés sur un échantillon de 531 firmes américaines, japonaises et françaises avec la méthode canonique corroborent l’existence de relations positives entre la concentration de la propriété, la domination des administrateurs internes et la structure non duale, d’une part, et l’investissement en R&D, d’autre part.(VA)In the theoretical framework of corporate governance, this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers for the purpose of privileging investment in R&D. This efficiency is sensitive to national systems of governance. Tests realized on a sample of 531 U.S., Japanese and French firms with the canonical method corroborate the existence of positive relationships between concentration of ownership, the internal administrator dominance and the non-dual structure on the one hand, and the investment in R&D, on the other.

Suggested Citation

  • Rim Zouari-Hadiji & Ghazi Zouari, 2010. "Gouvernance interne et investissement en R&D : une comparaison internationale," Working Papers CREGO 1100102, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1100102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Investissement en R&D; structure de propriété; conseil d’administration; gouvernance internationale; R&D Investment; ownership structure; board of directors; internal governance systems.;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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