Weighted Solidarity Values
We present a noncooperative bargaining protocol among n players, applied to the setting of cooperative games in coalitional form with transferable utility. In this model, players are chosen randomly to make proposals until one is accepted unanimously, and after each proposal rejection, the probability that players leave the game increases. If after a rejection, some players withdraw the bargaining, the remaining players continue the process. We define a new family of values, called the weighted solidarity values, and we show that these values arise as the associated equilibrium payoffs of this bargaining protocol. In these values players have an altruistic behavior between them as the null player property is not satisfied.
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- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996.
"Bargaining and Value,"
Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March.
- Nowak, Andrzej S & Radzik, Tadeusz, 1994. "A Solidarity Value for n-Person Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 43-48.
- Perez-Castrillo, D. & Wettstein, D., 1999. "Bidding for the Surplus: a Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value. ation," Papers 24-99, Tel Aviv.
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