Is the solidarity value close to the equal split value?
In the paper we study the asymptotic behavior of the solidarity value and the equal split value in different classes of cooperative games. In particular, we discuss three natural definitions of asymptotic equivalence of values for TU-games, and identify for each of them the classes of games for which the solidarity value and the equal split value are equivalent. Also, a computer illustration of the obtained results is given.
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Volume (Year): 65 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Chameni Nembua, Célestin, 2010.
"Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation,"
31249, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
- Chameni Nembua, C., 2012. "Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 431-433.
- Calvo, Emilio, 2006.
"Random Marginal and Random Removal values,"
142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Casajus, André, 2012. "Solidarity and fair taxation in TU games," Working Papers 111, University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science.
- Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2008.
"Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1677, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2010. "Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1625-1672, 09.
- Emilio Calvo & Esther Gutiérrez, 2012. "Weighted Solidarity Values," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0212, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994.
"Bargaining and value,"
Economics Working Papers
114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
- Nowak, Andrzej S & Radzik, Tadeusz, 1994. "A Solidarity Value for n-Person Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 43-48.
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