Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.003
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- Chameni Nembua, Célestin, 2010. "Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation," MPRA Paper 31249, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
References listed on IDEAS
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"The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
- Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "The Consensus Value : A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper 2004-50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2007. "The consensus value : A new solution concept for cooperative games," Other publications TiSEM 6cd44a12-a909-47f8-8d85-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "The Consensus Value : A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games," Other publications TiSEM ff51992e-6683-4596-a613-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez & Ruben Juarez & Luis Hernandez-Lamoneda, 2008. "Solutions without dummy axiom for TU cooperative games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(1), pages 1-9.
- Célestin Chameni Nembua & Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, 2008. "Linear, efficient and symmetric values for TU-games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(71), pages 1-10.
- van den Brink, Rene, 2007. "Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 767-775, September.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:71:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2009. "Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 303-340, September.
- Nowak, Andrzej S & Radzik, Tadeusz, 1994. "A Solidarity Value for n-Person Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 43-48.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank, 2014. "On a class of solidarity values," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 236(2), pages 583-591.
- René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2015. "Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 329-344, September.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015.
"A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games,"
Working Papers
2015-03, CRESE.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "A class of solidarity allocation rules for TU-games," Working Papers hal-01376906, HAL.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2016. "A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games," Post-Print halshs-01413042, HAL.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015.
"Axioms of invariance for TU-games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 891-902, November.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2012. "Axioms of Invariance for TU-games," Working Papers 2012-01, CRESE.
- Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Axioms of invariance for TU-games," MPRA Paper 41530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "Axioms of Invariance for TU-games," Post-Print halshs-01096552, HAL.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2017.
"Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(1), pages 61-94, June.
- Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2017. "Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games," Post-Print halshs-01446583, HAL.
- Chameni Nembua, C. & Miamo Wendji, C., 2016. "Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou–Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 117-133.
- Chameni Nembua, Célestin & Demsou, Themoi, 2013. "Ordinal equivalence of values and Pigou-Dalton transfers in TU-games," MPRA Paper 44895, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Mar 2013.
- Maimo, Clovis Wendji, 2017. "Matrix representation of TU-games for Linear Efficient and Symmetric values," MPRA Paper 82416, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank, 2013.
"Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 58-61.
- Casajus, André & Hüttner, Frank, 2012. "Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values," Working Papers 113, University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science.
- Nembua Célestin, Chameni & Wendji Clovis, Miamo, 2017. "On some decisive players for linear efficient and symmetric values in cooperative games with transferable utility," MPRA Paper 83670, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2017.
- Marcin Malawski, 2013. "“Procedural” values for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 305-324, February.
- Radzik, Tadeusz, 2013. "Is the solidarity value close to the equal split value?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 195-202.
- Yokote, Koji & Kongo, Takumi & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2018. "The balanced contributions property for equal contributors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 113-124.
- Emilio Calvo Ramón & Esther Gutiérrez-López, 2022. "The equal collective gains value in cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 249-278, March.
- Lee, Joosung & Driessen, Theo S.H., 2012. "Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: Characterization and application," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(3), pages 736-743.
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More about this item
Keywords
TU-games; Single valued solution; Shapley value; Marginal contribution; Null player axiom;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Value Theory
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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