IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation

  • Chameni Nembua, Célestin

Two well-known single valued solutions for TU-games are the Shapley value and Solidarity value, which verify three properties: Linearity, Symmetry and Efficiency, and the null player axiom. On the other hand, the interpretation of the two values is usually related on the marginal contribution of a player that joins a coalition. The paper generalizes the approach. First, the marginal contribution concept is extended to any valued solution that satisfies the three properties. Second, the null player axiom is also generalized and it is shown that any single valued solution satisfying the three properties is uniquely characterized by a null player axiom. In particular, the paper provides new interpretations, in the sense of marginal contribution, for other well-known single values such as Egalitarian value and Consensus value and also offers the opportunity for recasting in extensive form some well-established results.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 31249.

in new window

Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision: 2010
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31249
Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
  2. Célestin Chameni Nembua & Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, 2008. "Linear, efficient and symmetric values for TU-games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(71), pages 1-10.
  3. Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez & Ruben Juarez & Luis Hernandez-Lamoneda, 2008. "Solutions without dummy axiom for TU cooperative games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(1), pages 1-9.
  4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:1:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:71:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2009. "Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 303-340, September.
  7. Nowak, Andrzej S & Radzik, Tadeusz, 1994. "A Solidarity Value for n-Person Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 43-48.
  8. van den Brink, Rene, 2007. "Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 767-775, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31249. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.