Ordinal equivalence of values and Pigou-Dalton transfers in TU-games
The paper studies the ordinal equivalence of Linear, Efficient and Symmetry (LES) values in TU-games. It demonstrates that most of the results obtained by Carreras F, Freixas J (2008) in the case of semivalues and simple games are transposable on LES values and the whole TU-games set. In particular, linear and weakly linear games are analyzed. We characterize both values which are ordinal equivalent in all TU-games. Pigou-Dalton transfers are introduced for social comparison of values and to shed light on the way payoffs are redistributed from a value to another.
|Date of creation:||09 Mar 2013|
|Date of revision:||09 Mar 2013|
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Other publications TiSEM
6cd44a12-a909-47f8-8d85-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:1:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Célestin Chameni Nembua & Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, 2008. "Linear, efficient and symmetric values for TU-games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(71), pages 1-10.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:71:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
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