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Ordinal equivalence of values and Pigou-Dalton transfers in TU-games

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  • Chameni Nembua, Célestin
  • Demsou, Themoi

Abstract

The paper studies the ordinal equivalence of Linear, Efficient and Symmetry (LES) values in TU-games. It demonstrates that most of the results obtained by Carreras F, Freixas J (2008) in the case of semivalues and simple games are transposable on LES values and the whole TU-games set. In particular, linear and weakly linear games are analyzed. We characterize both values which are ordinal equivalent in all TU-games. Pigou-Dalton transfers are introduced for social comparison of values and to shed light on the way payoffs are redistributed from a value to another.

Suggested Citation

  • Chameni Nembua, Célestin & Demsou, Themoi, 2013. "Ordinal equivalence of values and Pigou-Dalton transfers in TU-games," MPRA Paper 44895, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Mar 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:44895
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    5. Célestin Chameni Nembua, 2006. "Linking Gini to Entropy : Measuring Inequality by an interpersonal class of indices," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(5), pages 1-9.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative games; desirability relation; linear values; linear games; Pigou-Dalton transfers; concentration; Lorenz dominance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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