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Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility

Author

Listed:
  • Sudhölter, Peter

    (Department of Economics)

  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

  • Vilella, Cori

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

Abstract

A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative allocation according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.

Suggested Citation

  • Sudhölter, Peter & Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel & Vilella, Cori, 2022. "Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility," Discussion Papers on Economics 9/2022, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2022_009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    nontransferable utility; average monotonicity; core; population monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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