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A new taxonomy of rewards in public administration for management implications

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Abstract

A fundamental question in the field of management is how rewards support the motivation and performance of individuals and the efficiency of organizations. Literature of public administration categorizes rewards with some dimensions, such as formality, tangibility, measurability, etc. However, these interpretative models seem to be incomplete because they don’t classify all the elements of rewards system within the domain of public administration. The purpose of this paper is to systematize the categories of rewards in a new taxonomy that also considers the dimension of legality in order to detect good and bad practices in public sector. This theoretical framework here may be a comprehensive model to analyze many elements of rewards system in public administration to support fruitful management implications. Moreover, this study begins the process of clarifying and generalizing, as far as possible, the comprehensive elements of rewards system in public organizations to lay a foundation for the development of more sophisticated taxonomies and theories.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Coccia & Igor Benati, 2018. "A new taxonomy of rewards in public administration for management implications," IRCrES Working Paper 201802, CNR-IRCrES Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY - former Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth - Torino (TO) ITALY.
    • Handle: RePEc:csc:ircrwp:201802
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Mario Coccia, 2006. "Classifications of innovations: Survey and future directions," CERIS Working Paper 200602, CNR-IRCrES Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth - Torino (TO) ITALY - former Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth - Moncalieri (TO) ITALY.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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