Does debt discipline state-owned firms? Evidence from a panel of Italian firms
This paper investigates whether financial pressure has an impact on the performance of state-owned firms. By combining different theoretical frameworks, we explore the conditions under which debt discipline becomes effective even for state firms. Using a panel of 1318 Italian state and private manufacturing companies, for the period 1977-1993, we estimate total factor productivity and employment equations, allowing the financial factors to have a different effect under "soft" and "hard" budget constraint regimes. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the results show that state firms do respond to financial pressure by increasing total productivity and reducing employment in a "hard" budget constraint environment.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1997|
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