On Keeping Your Powder Dry: Fiscal Foundations of Financial and Price Stability
Banking systems have rapidly grown to a point where for many countries bank assets amount to multiples of GDP. As a consequence, government’s capacity to provide stability-enhancing fiscal guarantees against systemic crises can no longer be taken for granted. As regulation of dynamic financial markets will inevitably be imperfect, prudent governments need to adjust other facets of macroeconomic policy in order to mitigate financial instability. A precautionary approach to fiscal policy, leading to moderate levels of public debt relative to GDP over the medium term, is essential for the credibility of government promises to support the financial system, as well as the broader economy.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- repec:oup:restud:v:71:y:2004:i::p:883-913 is not listed on IDEAS
- Woodford, Michael, 2001.
"Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(3), pages 669-728, August.
- Raghuram G. Rajan, 2004.
"Dollar Shortages and Crises,"
NBER Working Papers
10845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jordà, Òscar & Schularick, Moritz & Taylor, Alan M., 2013.
"Sovereigns versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and Consequences,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
9678, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Òscar Jordà & Moritz HP. Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 2013. "Sovereigns versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and Consequences," NBER Chapters, in: Sovereign Debt and Financial Crisis National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jorda, Oscar & Schularick, Moritz & Taylor, Alan M., 2013. "Sovereigns versus banks: credit, crises, and consequences," Working Paper Series 2013-37, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Òscar Jordà & Moritz HP. Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 2013. "Sovereigns versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and Consequences," NBER Working Papers 19506, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Òscar Jordà & Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 2013. "Sovereigns versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and Consequences," CESifo Working Paper Series 4431, CESifo Group Munich.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009.
"Varieties of Crises and Their Dates
[This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly]," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 8973.
- Martin Schneider & Aaron Tornell, 2004. "Balance Sheet Effects, Bailout Guarantees and Financial Crises," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 883-913.
- Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos, 1985. "Good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 1-24.
- Goodfriend, Marvin, 2011. "Central banking in the credit turmoil: An assessment of Federal Reserve practice," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-12, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9563. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask to update the entry or send us the correct email address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.