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Fixed-Mobile Integration


  • Bourreau, Marc
  • Cambini, Carlo
  • Hoernig, Steffen


Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains.

Suggested Citation

  • Bourreau, Marc & Cambini, Carlo & Hoernig, Steffen, 2013. "Fixed-Mobile Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 9361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9361

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Vogelsang, Ingo, 2010. "The relationship between mobile and fixed-line communications: A survey," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 4-17, March.
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    8. Tommaso Valletti & George Houpis, 2005. "Mobile Termination: What is the “Right” Charge?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 235-258, November.
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    14. Cambini, Carlo, 2001. "Competition between vertically integrated networks," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 137-165, June.
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    19. Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso, 2005. "Information Exchange and Competition in Communications Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 5031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vogelsang Ingo, 2013. "The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 64(3), pages 193-270, December.
    2. Muck, Johannes, 2016. "Tariff-mediated network effects with incompletely informed consumers," DICE Discussion Papers 210, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

    More about this item


    Call externality; Integration; Network competition; On/off-net pricing;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation

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