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Sinking, Swimming, or Learning to Swim in Medicare Part D

Author Info

  • Ketcham, Jonathan D.
  • Lucarelli, Claudio
  • Miravete, Eugenio J
  • Roebuck, M Christopher

Abstract

Under Medicare Part D, senior citizens choose prescription drug insurance off red by numerous private insurers. We examine non-poor enrollees' actions in 2006 and 2007 using panel data. Our sample reduced overspending by $298 on average, with gains by 81% of them. The greatest improvements were by those who overspent most in 2006 and by those who switched plans. Decisions to switch depended on individuals' overspending in 2006 and on individual-specific effects of changes in their current plans. The oldest consumers and those initiating medications for Alzheimer's disease improved by more than average, suggesting that real-world institutions help overcome cognitive limitations.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8585.

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Date of creation: Sep 2011
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8585
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Keywords: Insurance Plan Switching; Overspending; Prescription Drugs;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
  • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
  • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
  • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
  • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
  • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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  1. Florian Heiss & Daniel McFadden & Joachim Winter, 2009. "Regulation of private health insurance markets: Lessons from enrollment, plan type choice, and adverse selection in Medicare Part D," NBER Working Papers 15392, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  7. John A. List, 2006. "The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-37, February.
  8. Nicholas Economides & V. Brian Viard & Katja Seim, 2007. "Quantifying the Benefits of Entry into Local Phone Service," Working Papers 07-48, NET Institute, revised Dec 2007.
  9. Florian Heiss & Daniel McFadden & Joachim Winter, 2007. "Mind the Gap! Consumer Perceptions and Choices of Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Plans," NBER Working Papers 13627, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  11. Kosali I. Simon & Claudio Lucarelli, 2006. "What Drove First Year Premiums in Stand-Alone Medicare Drug Plans?," NBER Working Papers 12595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2006. "Paying Not to Go to the Gym," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 694-719, June.
  13. Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell & Vilsa Curto, 2009. "Financial Literacy and Financial Sophistication Among Older Americans," NBER Working Papers 15469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. John A. List, 2003. "Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 41-71, February.
  15. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2003. "Choosing the Wrong Calling Plan? Ignorance and Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 297-310, March.
  16. Heiss, Florian & McFadden, Daniel L. & Winter, Joachim, 2006. "Who failed to enroll in Medicare Part D, and why? Early results," Munich Reprints in Economics 19427, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  17. Mark Duggan & Patrick Healy & Fiona Scott Morton, 2008. "Providing Prescription Drug Coverage to the Elderly: America's Experiment with Medicare Part D," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 69-92, Fall.
  18. Goldman Dana P & McFadden Daniel L, 2008. "Want to Monitor Medicare's New Drug Benefit Program? Start by Sending a Check for $120,000," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 5(4), pages 1-4, July.
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Cited by:

  1. Vetter, Stefan & Heiss, Florian & McFadden, Daniel & Winter, Joachim, 2012. "Risk attitudes and Medicare Part D enrollment decisions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 373, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  2. Mark Duggan & Amanda Starc & Boris Vabson, 2014. "Who Benefits when the Government Pays More? Pass-Through in the Medicare Advantage Program," Discussion Papers 14-004, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  3. Florian Heiss & Adam Leive & Daniel McFadden & Joachim Winter, 2012. "Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from Administrative Data," NBER Working Papers 18166, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Jeffrey R. Kling & Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir & Lee C. Vermeulen & Marian V. Wrobel, 2012. "Comparison Friction: Experimental Evidence from Medicare Drug Plans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 199-235.
  5. Vetter, Stefan & Heiss, Florian & McFadden, Daniel & Winter, Joachim, 2012. "Risk attitudes and Medicare Part D enrollment decisions," Discussion Papers in Economics 12740, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert Town, 2014. "The Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 19800, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Barbara Kahn & Alexander Chernev & Ulf Böckenholt & Kate Bundorf & Michaela Draganska & Ryan Hamilton & Robert Meyer & Klaus Wertenbroch, 2014. "Consumer and managerial goals in assortment choice and design," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 293-303, September.
  8. Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, 2013. "Evolving Choice Inconsistencies in Choice of Prescription Drug Insurance," NBER Working Papers 19163, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Andrew Stocking & James Baumgardner & Melinda Buntin & Anna Cook, 2014. "Examining the Number of Competitors and the Cost of Medicare Part D: Working Paper 2014-04," Working Papers 45553, Congressional Budget Office.
  10. Wuppermann, Amelie C. & Bauhoff, Sebastian & Grabka, Markus M., 2014. "The Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice: Evidence from Retirees in the German Social Health Insurance," Discussion Papers in Economics 21080, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

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  1. Sinking, Swimming, or Learning to Swim in Medicare Part D (AER 2006) in ReplicationWiki

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