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Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed?

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  • Bosetti, Valentina
  • Carraro, Carlo
  • Tavoni, Massimo

Abstract

This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1) countries decide to delay their GHG emission reductions by 30 years. What would be the cost difference between this scenario and a case in which both developed and developing countries start reducing their emissions at the same time? Then, we look at a scenario in which the timing of developing countries’ participation is uncertain and again we compute the costs of climate policy in developed and developing countries. We find that delayed participation of NA1 countries has a negative impact on climate policy costs. Economic inefficiencies can be as large as 10-25 TlnUSD. However, this additional cost wanes when developing countries are allowed to trade emission reductions from their baseline emission paths during the 30-year delay period. Thus, irrespective of whether NA1 countries are immediately assigned an emission reduction target or not, they should nonetheless be included in a global carbon market. Technology deployment is also affected by the timing of developing countries’ mitigation measures. Delayed NA1-country participation in a climate agreement would scale down the deployment of coal with CCS throughout the century. On the other hand, innovation in the form of energy R&D investments would be positively affected, since it would become crucial in developed countries. Finally, uncertainty about the timing of NA1-country participation does not modify the optimal abatement strategy for developed countries and does not alter policy costs as long as a global carbon market is in place.

Suggested Citation

  • Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & Tavoni, Massimo, 2008. "Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6967
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & Massetti, Emanuele & Tavoni, Massimo, 2008. "International energy R&D spillovers and the economics of greenhouse gas atmospheric stabilization," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 2912-2929, November.
    2. Warwick J. McKibbin & Martin T. Ross & Robert Shackleton & Peter J. Wilcoxen, 1999. "Emissions Trading, Capital Flows and the Kyoto Protocol," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 287-333.
    3. Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & Massetti, Emanuele, 2009. "Banking permits: Economic efficiency and distributional effects," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 382-403, May.
    4. Bosetti, Valentina & Tavoni, Massimo, 2009. "Uncertain R&D, backstop technology and GHGs stabilization," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(Supplemen), pages 18-26.
    5. Tavoni, Massimo & Sohngen, Brent & Bosetti, Valentina, 2007. "Forestry and the carbon market response to stabilize climate," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 5346-5353, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Valentina Bosetti & David G. Victor, 2011. "Politics and Economics of Second-Best Regulation of Greenhouse Gases: The Importance of Regulatory Credibility," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 1-24.
    2. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Alessandra Sgobbi & Massimo Tavoni, 2008. "Modelling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures. A Quantitative and Comparative Assessment of Architectures for Agreement," Working Papers 2008.85, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Massimo Tavoni & Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro, 2009. "Climate Change Mitigation Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action," Working Papers 2009.53, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & Sgobbi, Alessandra & Tavoni, Massimo, 2008. "Delayed Action and Uncertain Targets. How Much Will Climate Policy Cost?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6973, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & Massetti, Emanuele & Sgobbi, Alessandra & Tavoni, Massimo, 2009. "Optimal energy investment and R&D strategies to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 123-137, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate Policy; Delayed Action; Stabilisation Costs; Uncertain Participation;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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