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Modelling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures. A Quantitative and Comparative Assessment of Architectures for Agreement

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  • Valentina Bosetti
  • Carlo Carraro
  • Alessandra Sgobbi
  • Massimo Tavoni

Abstract

This paper provides a quantitative comparison of the main architectures for an agreement on climate policy. Possible successors to the Kyoto protocol are assessed according to four criteria: economic efficiency; environmental effectiveness; distributional implications; and their political acceptability which is measured in terms of feasibility and enforceability. The ultimate aim is to derive useful information for designing a future agreement on climate change control.

Suggested Citation

  • Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Alessandra Sgobbi & Massimo Tavoni, 2008. "Modelling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures. A Quantitative and Comparative Assessment of Architectures for Agreement," CESifo Working Paper Series 2417, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2417
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & Massetti, Emanuele & Tavoni, Massimo, 2007. "Optimal Energy Investment and R&D Strategies to Stabilise Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Concentrations," CEPR Discussion Papers 6549, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Marzio Galeotti & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2006. "WITCH. A World Induced Technical Change Hybrid Model," Working Papers 2006_46, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    3. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Massimo Tavoni, 2008. "Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2445, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Joseph E. Aldy & Scott Barrett & Robert N. Stavins, 2003. "Thirteen plus one: a comparison of global climate policy architectures," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(4), pages 373-397, December.
    5. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 379-396, December.
    6. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    7. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Sonia Oreffice, 2009. "Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 42(3), pages 411-425, March.
    8. Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, 2006. "A Credible Foundation For Long Term International Cooperation On Climate Change," CAMA Working Papers 2006-15, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    9. Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & Massetti, Emanuele & Sgobbi, Alessandra & Tavoni, Massimo, 2009. "Optimal energy investment and R&D strategies to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 123-137, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan P. Schleicher & Angela Köppl, 2012. "Scanning for Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Targets and their Distributions," Working Papers 2012.36, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Valentina Bosetti & David G. Victor, 2011. "Politics and Economics of Second-Best Regulation of Greenhouse Gases: The Importance of Regulatory Credibility," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 1-24.
    3. Valentina Bosetti & Jeffrey Frankel, 2014. "Sustainable Cooperation In Global Climate Policy: Specific Formulas And Emission Targets," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 1-34.
    4. Frankel, Jeffrey A. & Bosetti, Valentina, 2011. "Politically Feasible Emission Target Formulas to Attain 460 ppm CO[subscript 2] Concentrations," Working Paper Series rwp11-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    5. Lutz, Christian & Meyer, Bernd, 2009. "Environmental and economic effects of post-Kyoto carbon regimes: Results of simulations with the global model GINFORS," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1758-1766, May.
    6. Valentina Bosetti & Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2011. "Sustainable Cooperation in Global Climate Policy: Specific Formulas and Emission Targets to Build on Copenhagen and Cancun," NBER Working Papers 17669, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Thomas Brenner & Daniel Lee, 2014. "Weather Conditions and Economic Growth - Is Productivity Hampered by Climate Change?," Working Papers on Innovation and Space 2014-06, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    8. Bosetti, Valentina & Frankel, Jeffrey A., 2011. "Politically Feasible Emission Target Formulas to Attain 460 ppm CO2 Concentrations," Scholarly Articles 4735391, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    9. Purdon, Mark, 2015. "Opening the Black Box of Carbon Finance “Additionality”: The Political Economy of Carbon Finance Effectiveness across Tanzania, Uganda, and Moldova," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 462-478.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    climate policy; integrated modelling; international agreements;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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