IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/15902.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Migration and Redistribution: Federal Governance of an Economic Union Matters

Author

Listed:
  • Razin, Assaf
  • Sadka, Efraim

Abstract

Both the U.S. and the EU are an economic union: There is a single market for goods, capital, finance, and labor. That is, there is free mobility of goods and services, physical and financial capital, and labor among the member countries of the union. Nevertheless, there is much higher degree of economic policy coordination among the member states of the U.S than of the EU. For instance, the U.S. has a common (federal) income tax system which constitutes the major source of revenues in the union. Similarly, the social security system is more or less uniform across the U.S. There is also a single migration policy set up and enforced by the federal government. In contrast, there is very little coordination on these issues among the member countries of the EU. We argue by using a migration-based, fiscal-externality, model that the degree of coordination among the member states potentially contribute a great deal to our understanding of observed policy differences between the EU and the US as economic unions: the generosity of the welfare state and the skill composition of migration.

Suggested Citation

  • Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 2021. "Migration and Redistribution: Federal Governance of an Economic Union Matters," CEPR Discussion Papers 15902, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15902
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP15902
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 2014. "Migration and Welfare State: Why is America Different from Europe?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Tito Boeri, 2010. "Immigration to the Land of Redistribution," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(308), pages 651-687, October.
    3. Assaf Razin & Jackline Wahba, 2015. "Welfare Magnet Hypothesis, Fiscal Burden, and Immigration Skill Selectivity," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(2), pages 369-402, April.
    4. Kjetil Storesletten, 2000. "Sustaining Fiscal Policy through Immigration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 300-323, April.
    5. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1991. "International tax competition and gains from tax harmonization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 69-76, September.
    6. Claudia Goldin, 1994. "The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United States, 1890 to 1921," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 223-258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Rebecca M. Blank, 1997. "Policy Watch: The 1996 Welfare Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 169-177, Winter.
    8. David Romer, 1998. "A New Assessment of Openness and Inflation: Reply," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 649-652.
    9. Thomas J. Sargent, 2012. "Nobel Lecture: United States Then, Europe Now," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(1), pages 1-40.
    10. Assaf Razin & Jackline Wahba, 2015. "Welfare Magnet Hypothesis, Fiscal Burden, and Immigration Skill Selectivity," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(2), pages 369-402, April.
    11. Boeri, Tito & Hanson, Gordon H. & McCormick, Barry (ed.), 2002. "Immigration Policy and the Welfare System: A Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199256310.
    12. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 2016. "Toward an International Migration Regime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 451-455, May.
    13. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    14. Mendoza, Enrique G. & Tesar, Linda L., 2005. "Why hasn't tax competition triggered a race to the bottom? Some quantitative lessons from the EU," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 163-204, January.
    15. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 2014. "Migration States and Welfare States: Why Is America Different from Europe?," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-44380-9.
    16. Goldin, Claudia & Libecap, Gary D. (ed.), 1994. "The Regulated Economy," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226301105, December.
    17. Lans Bovenberg & Sijbren Cnossen & Ruud de Mooij, 2003. "Introduction: Tax Coordination in the European Union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(6), pages 619-624, November.
    18. Assaf Razin, 2021. "Globalization, Migration, and Welfare State," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-64392-8, September.
    19. Tito Boeri, 2008. "Brain Gain: A European Approach, Introduction by Tito Boeri," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(03), pages 30-34, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Razin, Assaf, 2020. "Migration and Fiscal Externality: US vs. Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 15455, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 2016. "Migration and Redistribution: Why the Federal Governance of an Economic Union Matters," NBER Working Papers 22329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 2015. "Migration State and Welfare State: Competition vs. Coordination in an Economic Union," NBER Working Papers 21606, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 2016. "Migration and Redistribution: Why the Federal Governance Structure of the Economic Union Matters," CESifo Working Paper Series 5920, CESifo.
    5. Razin, Assaf & Schwemmer, Alexander, 2020. "Ageing-Driven Migration and Redistribution: Comparing Policy Regimes," CEPR Discussion Papers 14574, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 2014. "Migration and Welfare State: Why is America Different from Europe?," NBER Working Papers 20450, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 2018. "The Welfare State besides Globalization Forces," NBER Working Papers 24919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Zaiceva, A. & Zimmermann, K.F., 2016. "Migration and the Demographic Shift," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 119-177, Elsevier.
    9. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 2018. "Financial Globalization and the Welfare State," CEPR Discussion Papers 12998, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Bettin, Giulia & Sacchi, Agnese, 2020. "Health spending in Italy: The impact of immigrants," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    11. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 2011. "Tax Competition And Migration: The Race-To-The-Bottom Hypothesis Revisited," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275761, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    12. Anthony Edo & Lionel Ragot & Hillel Rapoport & Sulin Sardoschau & Andreas Steinmayr & Arthur Sweetman, 2020. "An introduction to the economics of immigration in OECD countries," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 1365-1403, November.
    13. Assaf Razin, 2017. "Globalization Policies and Israel’s Brain Drain," NBER Working Papers 23251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Ian Preston, 2014. "The Effect of Immigration on Public Finances," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(580), pages 569-592, November.
    15. Ferrie, Joseph & Hatton, Timothy J., 2013. "Two Centuries of International Migration," IZA Discussion Papers 7866, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Takuya Matsuyama & Tomomi Miyazaki, 2017. "The Effects of Immigration on Social Expenditure in Host Countries," Discussion Papers 1708, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
    17. Pawel Kaczmarczyk, 2013. "Are immigrants a burden for the state budget? Review paper," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers p0356, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    18. Shenghua Xie & Juan Chen & Veli-Matti Ritakallio & Xiangming Leng, 2021. "Welfare migration or migrant selection? Social insurance participation and rural migrants’ intentions to seek permanent urban settlement in China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 58(10), pages 1983-2003, August.
    19. Jakubiak Igor, 2017. "Migration and Welfare Systems – State of the Art and Research Challenges," Central European Economic Journal, Sciendo, vol. 1(48), pages 51-70, November.
    20. Salvador Traettino, 2022. "Migración forzada y finanzas públicas locales: Evidencia de los municipios en Colombia," Documentos CEDE 20335, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15902. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.