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Tax Competition And Migration: The Race-To-The-Bottom Hypothesis Revisited

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  • Razin, Assaf
  • Sadka, Efraim

Abstract

The literature on tax competition with free capital mobility cites several reasons for the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis in the sense that tax competition may yield significantly lower tax rates than tax coordination. With a fixed (exogenously given) population that can move from one fiscal jurisdiction to another, the Tiebout paradigm suggests that tax competition among these jurisdictions yields an efficient outcome, so that there are no gains from tax coordination. The Tiebout paradigm considers the allocation of a given population among competing localities. Our model of international tax-transfer and migration competition among host countries deviates from the Tiebout paradigm in that the total population in the host countries and its skill distribution are endogenously determined through migration of various skills. As a result, competition needs not be efficient. This paper suggests that when a group of host countries faces an upward supply of immigrants, tax competition does not indeed lead to a race to the bottom; competition may lead to higher taxes than coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 2011. "Tax Competition And Migration: The Race-To-The-Bottom Hypothesis Revisited," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275761, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275761
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275761
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    2. Mendoza, Enrique G. & Tesar, Linda L., 2005. "Why hasn't tax competition triggered a race to the bottom? Some quantitative lessons from the EU," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 163-204, January.
    3. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1991. "International tax competition and gains from tax harmonization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 69-76, September.
    4. Lans Bovenberg & Sijbren Cnossen & Ruud de Mooij, 2003. "Introduction: Tax Coordination in the European Union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(6), pages 619-624, November.
    5. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 2010. "Fiscal and Migration Competition," NBER Working Papers 16224, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chirinko, Robert S. & Wilson, Daniel J., 2017. "Tax competition among U.S. states: Racing to the bottom or riding on a seesaw?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 147-163.
    2. Soojin Kim, 2014. "The Effects of Labor Migration on Optimal Taxation: An International Tax Competition Analysis," 2014 Meeting Papers 508, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Demand and Price Analysis; Financial Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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