IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/12502.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Market Power and the Laffer Curve

Author

Listed:
  • Miravete, Eugenio J
  • Seim, Katja
  • Thurk, Jeff

Abstract

We characterize the trade-off between consumption tax rates and tax revenue -- the Laffer curve -- while allowing for re-optimization by both consumers and firms with market power. Using detailed data from Pennsylvania, a state that monopolizes retail sales of alcoholic beverages, we estimate a discrete choice demand model allowing for flexible substitution patterns between products and across demographic groups while not imposing conduct among upstream distillers. We find that current policy overprices spirits and that firms respond to reductions in the state's ad valorem tax rate by increasing wholesale prices. The upstream response thus limits the state's revenue gain from lower tax rates to only 14% of the incremental tax revenue predicted under the common assumption of perfect competition. The burden of such naive policy falls disproportionately on older, poorer, uneducated, and minority consumers. Upstream collusion exacerbates these effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Miravete, Eugenio J & Seim, Katja & Thurk, Jeff, 2017. "Market Power and the Laffer Curve," CEPR Discussion Papers 12502, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12502
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12502
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fullerton, Don, 1982. "On the possibility of an inverse relationship between tax rates and government revenues," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 3-22, October.
    2. Brian McManus, 2007. "Nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly market: the case of specialty coffee," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 512-532, June.
    3. Laura Grigolon & Frank Verboven, 2014. "Nested Logit or Random Coefficients Logit? A Comparison of Alternative Discrete Choice Models of Product Differentiation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 96(5), pages 916-935, December.
    4. Rachel Griffith & Martin O'Connell & Kate Smith, 2017. "Design of optimal corrective taxes in the alcohol market," IFS Working Papers W17/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    5. Novales, Alfonso & Ruiz, Jesus, 2002. "Dynamic Laffer curves," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 181-206, December.
    6. Eugenio J. Miravete & Katja Seim & Jeff Thurk, 2017. "One Markup to Rule Them All: Taxation by Liquor Pricing Regulation," NBER Working Papers 24124, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Katja Seim & Joel Waldfogel, 2013. "Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Entry Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 831-862, April.
    8. Meng, Yang & Brennan, Alan & Purshouse, Robin & Hill-McManus, Daniel & Angus, Colin & Holmes, John & Meier, Petra Sylvia, 2014. "Estimation of own and cross price elasticities of alcohol demand in the UK—A pseudo-panel approach using the Living Costs and Food Survey 2001–2009," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 96-103.
    9. Sofia Berto Villas-Boas, 2007. "Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 625-652.
    10. Kenneth L. Judd & Ben Skrainka, 2011. "High performance quadrature rules: how numerical integration affects a popular model of product differentiation," CeMMAP working papers CWP03/11, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    11. A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), 1985. "Handbook of Public Economics," Handbook of Public Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eugenio J. Miravete & Katja Seim & Jeff Thurk, 2017. "One Markup to Rule Them All: Taxation by Liquor Pricing Regulation," NBER Working Papers 24124, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. repec:eee:pubeco:v:172:y:2019:i:c:p:20-35 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Griffith, Rachel & O’Connell, Martin & Smith, Kate, 2019. "Tax design in the alcohol market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 20-35.
    4. Hollenbeck, Brett & Uetake, Kosuke, 2018. "Taxation and Market Power in the Legal Marijuana Industry," MPRA Paper 90085, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Laffer Curve; market power; Public Monopoly Pricing; Tax Incidence;

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12502. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.