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Regulation under Asymmetric Information in Water Utilities

Author

Listed:
  • Isabelle Brocas
  • Kitty Chan
  • Isabelle Perrigne

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Isabelle Brocas & Kitty Chan & Isabelle Perrigne, 2006. "Regulation under Asymmetric Information in Water Utilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 62-66, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:2:p:62-66
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282806777212369
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447 Elsevier.
    2. Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L., 1989. "The effects of economic regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 25, pages 1449-1506 Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2009. "Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00622963, HAL.
    2. Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc, 2010. "Regulatory Schemes and Political Capture in a Local Public Sector," TSE Working Papers 10-158, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. repec:bla:jindec:v:65:y:2017:i:1:p:1-38 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:eee:trapol:v:62:y:2018:i:c:p:21-30 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Barbosa, Alexandro & Lima, Severino Cesário de & Brusca, Isabel, 2016. "Governance and efficiency in the Brazilian water utilities: A dynamic analysis in the process of universal access," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(PA), pages 82-96.
    6. Ali Yurukoglu & Claire Lim, 2014. "Dynamic Natural Monopoly Regulation: Time Inconsistency, Asymmetric Information, and Political Environments," 2014 Meeting Papers 530, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Guerriero, Carmine, 2013. "The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 91-107.
    8. Jansen, Jos & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2008. "The organization of regulated production: Complementarities, correlation and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 327-353, January.
    9. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
    10. Haug, Peter, 2007. "Local Government Control and Efficiency of the Water Industry: An Empirical Analysis of Water Suppliers in East Germany," IWH Discussion Papers 3/2007, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    11. Barbosa, Alexandro & Brusca, Isabel, 2015. "Governance structures and their impact on tariff levels of Brazilian water and sanitation corporations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 94-105.

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