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Group Identity and Coalition Formation: Experiments in a three?player divide the dollar Game

  • Tremewan, James

This paper is an experimental study on the effect of group identity on the formation of coalitions and the resulting distribution of resources. After inducing group identity based on preferences over paintings, subjects play symmetric three-player _divide the dollar_ games with a majority rule decision process. The main finding is that where two players are from one group and one from the other, those in the minority earn significantly less than majority players. This is largely a result of a two-way split between majority players occurring more frequently, either because of the increased salience of this outcome, or a shift in social preferences.

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Paper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) with number 1020.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpm:docweb:1020
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  1. Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2005. "Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 278-311, February.
  2. Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
  3. Holm, Håkan, 2000. "What’s in a Name? - An ethnical discrimination experiment," Working Papers 2000:3, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 16 Apr 2001.
  4. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:116:y:2001:i:1:p:161-188 is not listed on IDEAS
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