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Group Identity and Coalition Formation: Experiments in a three?player divide the dollar Game

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  • Tremewan, James

Abstract

This paper is an experimental study on the effect of group identity on the formation of coalitions and the resulting distribution of resources. After inducing group identity based on preferences over paintings, subjects play symmetric three-player _divide the dollar_ games with a majority rule decision process. The main finding is that where two players are from one group and one from the other, those in the minority earn significantly less than majority players. This is largely a result of a two-way split between majority players occurring more frequently, either because of the increased salience of this outcome, or a shift in social preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Tremewan, James, 2010. "Group Identity and Coalition Formation: Experiments in a three?player divide the dollar Game," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 1020, CEPREMAP.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpm:docweb:1020
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    File URL: https://www.cepremap.fr/depot/docweb/docweb1020.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Igor Asanov & Maria Mavlikeeva, 2023. "Can group identity explain the gender gap in the recruitment process?," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 95-113, January.
    2. M Blanco & J. A. Guerra, 2020. "To segregate, or to discriminate – that is the question: experiment on identity and social preferences," Documentos de Trabajo 18407, Universidad del Rosario.
    3. Fuhai Hong & Yohanes E. Riyanto & Ruike Zhang, 2022. "Multidimensional social identity and redistributive preferences: an experimental study," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 151-184, July.
    4. Ibanez, Marcela & Schaffland, Elke, 2018. "Organizational performance with in-group and out-group leaders: An experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 1-10.

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