Culture in Organizations: Inertia and Uniformity
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ruckes, Martin & Rønde, Thomas, 2010. "Dynamic incentives in organizations: Success and inertia," Working Paper Series in Economics 7, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
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