Innovation management in organizations
This paper poses the question of how a firm should optimally choose both its organization and its compensation in the pursuit of innovation. One key result is that incentive pay arises as a robust instrument of innovation management both with and without delegation, although in the present model its primary purpose is not to elicit more effort for the creation of new ideas, but to ensure that new ideas are implemented if and only if this is efficient. While without delegation, the firm may "underinvest" in innovation, with delegation the opposite bias may arise as new ideas may be implemented too often ("overinvestment"). The optimal organizational choice trades off these two biases.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Holmstrom, Bengt, 1989. "Agency costs and innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 305-327, December.
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1992.
"Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 600-614, June.
- Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1989. "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences," Discussion Papers 850, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1990. "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 215, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1994. "Benefits of Narrow Business Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1330-1349, December.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
- Ricardo Alonso & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "Optimal Delegation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 259-293.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Matouschek, Niko, 2005. "Optimal Delegation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5289, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58.
- Jensen, Michael C, 1993. " The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 831-880, July.
- Michael C. Jensen, 1994. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, And The Failure Of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 6(4), pages 4-23.
- Holmström, Bengt, 1989. "Agency Costs and Innovation," Working Paper Series 214, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Steven D. Levitt & Christopher M. Snyder, 1997. "Is No. News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 641-661, Winter.
- Julie Wulf, 2007. "AUTHORITY, RISK, AND PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM DIVISION MANAGER POSITIONS INSIDE FIRMS -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 169-196, 03. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:53:y:2009:i:8:p:871-887. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.