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The Effect of Communication Channels on Lying

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  • Julian Conrads

    (University of Cologne)

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of different channels of communication on lying behavior. A simple coin flip game with four coin tosses is adapted in which subjects have monetary incentives to misreport their private information. The treatments differ with respect to the communication channel employed to convey the private information, i.e., face-to face, phone, computer-mediated, and online. Against the hypotheses, the results show that a majority of subjects lies independently of communication channel in use. However, the decision whether to lie either to some or the full extent depends on the communication channel. Compared to more socially-distant communication, direct communication encourages partial lying, but decreases lying to the extreme. Women tend to lie to the full extent only under online communication. Social distance considerations and the probability of being detect lying may drive observed behavioral patterns. The findings highlight the relevance of lying costs in relation to the decision making environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Julian Conrads, 2014. "The Effect of Communication Channels on Lying," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 05-06, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:cgr:cgsser:05-06
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    File URL: http://www.cgs.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/cgs/pdf/working_paper/cgswp_05-06.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Schitter & Jürgen Fleiß & Stefan Palan, 2017. "To claim or not to claim: Anonymity, reciprocal externalities and honesty," Working Paper Series, Social and Economic Sciences 2017-01, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Karl-Franzens-University Graz.
    2. Alain Cohn & Tobias Gesche & Michel André Maréchal, 2018. "Honesty in the Digital Age," CESifo Working Paper Series 6996, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Ellen Garbarino & Robert Slonim & Marie Claire Villeval, 2016. "Loss Aversion and lying behavior: Theory, estimation and empirical evidence," Working Papers 1631, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. Conrads, Julian & Reggiani, Tommaso G., 2014. "The Effect of Communication Channels on Promise-Making and Promise-Keeping," IZA Discussion Papers 8534, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2016. "Preferences for Truth-Telling," CESifo Working Paper Series 6087, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. repec:eee:jeborg:v:158:y:2019:i:c:p:379-393 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:spr:jeicoo:v:12:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11403-016-0177-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Christine Laudenbach & Jenny Pirschel & Stephan Siegel, 2018. "Personal Communication in a Fintech World: Evidence from Loan Payments," CESifo Working Paper Series 7295, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Susanne Braun & Lars Hornuf, 2015. "Leadership and persistency in spontaneuous dishonesty," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201510, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    10. Julia Kramer & Silvia Lübbecke & Nina Lucia Stephan, 2019. "Do children stop cheating when someone else reaps the benefits? A lab in the field experiment," Working Papers Dissertations 33, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    11. Ximena Garcia-Rada & Heather E. Mann & Lars Hornuf & Matthias Sohn & Juan Tafurt & Edwin S. Iversen Jr & Dan Ariely, 2018. "The Adaptive Liar: An Interactionist Approach of Multiple Dishonesty Domains," CESifo Working Paper Series 7215, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiment; private information; lying costs; communication;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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