IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cge/wacage/455.html

Do British wind generators behave strategically in response to the Western Link interconnector?

Author

Listed:
  • Intini, Mario

    (University of Bari Aldo Moro)

  • Waterson, Michael

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

In Britain, the key source of renewable generation is wind, most abundant on the west coast of Scotland, where there is relatively little demand. For this reason, an interconnector, the Western Link, was built to take electricity closer to demand. When the Link is operating, payments by National Grid to constrain wind farms not to produce will be lower, we may predict, since fewer or less restrictive constraints need be imposed. But the Link has not been working consistently. We empirically estimate the link’s value. Focusing on the three most recent episodes of outage, starting on 4th May 2018 up to 25th September 2019, our essential approach is to treat these outages as a natural experiment using hourly data. Our results reveal that the Link had an important role in costs saved and price constrained and MWh curtailed reductions. We estimate a cost-saving of almost £30m. However, the saving appears to drop over time, so we investigate wind farms’ behavior. We find that wind farms behave strategically since the accuracy of wind forecasting depends on the relevant prices impacting their earnings

Suggested Citation

  • Intini, Mario & Waterson, Michael, 2020. "Do British wind generators behave strategically in response to the Western Link interconnector?," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 455, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:455
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/455-2020_waterson.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:aen:journl:ej39-si1-giulietti is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Thomas Greve & Michael G. Pollitt, 2016. "A VCG Auction for Electricity Storage," Working Papers EPRG 1613, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    3. Vladimir Parail, 2009. "Can Merchant Interconnectors Deliver Lower and More Stable Prices? The Case of NorNed," Working Papers EPRG 0926, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    4. Battaglini, Antonella & Komendantova, Nadejda & Brtnik, Patricia & Patt, Anthony, 2012. "Perception of barriers for expansion of electricity grids in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 254-259.
    5. Waterson, Michael, 2017. "The characteristics of electricity storage, renewables and markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 466-473.
    6. Monica Giulietti, Luigi Grossi, Elisa Trujillo Baute, and Michael Waterson, 2018. "Analyzing the Potential Economic Value of Energy Storage," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I).
    7. Sioshansi, Ramteen & Denholm, Paul & Jenkin, Thomas & Weiss, Jurgen, 2009. "Estimating the value of electricity storage in PJM: Arbitrage and some welfare effects," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 269-277, March.
    8. Hobbs, B.F. & Rijkers, F.A.M., 2005. "The More Cooperation, the More Competition? A Cournot Analysis of the Benefits of Electric Market Coupling," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0509, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    9. Malaguzzi Valeri, Laura, 2009. "Welfare and competition effects of electricity interconnection between Ireland and Great Britain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4679-4688, November.
    10. repec:aen:journl:2011v32-02-a01 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:aen:journl:2005v26-04-a05 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Schill, Wolf-Peter & Kemfert, Claudia, 2011. "Modeling Strategic Electricity Storage: The Case of Pumped Hydro Storage in Germany," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 59-87.
    13. repec:aen:journl:32-3-a03 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Sioshansi, Ramteen, 2014. "When energy storage reduces social welfare," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 106-116.
    15. Andreas Ehrenmann & Karsten Neuhoff, 2009. "A Comparison of Electricity Market Designs in Networks," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 57(2), pages 274-286, April.
    16. Parail, V., 2009. "Can Merchant Interconnectors Deliver Lower and More Stable Prices? The Case of NorNed," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0947, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    17. Denny, E. & Tuohy, A. & Meibom, P. & Keane, A. & Flynn, D. & Mullane, A. & O'Malley, M., 2010. "The impact of increased interconnection on electricity systems with large penetrations of wind generation: A case study of Ireland and Great Britain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(11), pages 6946-6954, November.
    18. Neuhoff, Karsten & Newbery, David, 2005. "Evolution of electricity markets: Does sequencing matter?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 163-173, June.
    19. repec:aen:journl:2010v31-02-a07 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Dutton, Joseph & Lockwood, Matthew, 2017. "Ideas, institutions and interests in the politics of cross-border electricity interconnection: Greenlink, Britain and Ireland," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 375-385.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Creti, Anna & Fumagalli, Eileen & Fumagalli, Elena, 2010. "Integration of electricity markets in Europe: Relevant issues for Italy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(11), pages 6966-6976, November.
    2. Nepal, Rabindra & Jamasb, Tooraj, 2012. "Interconnections and market integration in the Irish Single Electricity Market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 425-434.
    3. Luigi De Paoli & Elena Fumagalli, 2013. "Estimating welfare losses and gains in explicit auctions for power trade: an application to the Italian case," ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2013(2), pages 153-181.
    4. Vika Koban, 2017. "The impact of market coupling on Hungarian and Romanian electricity markets: Evidence from the regime-switching model," Energy & Environment, , vol. 28(5-6), pages 621-638, September.
    5. Loisel, Rodica & Simon, Corentin, 2021. "Market strategies for large-scale energy storage: Vertical integration versus stand-alone player," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    6. Dutton, Joseph & Lockwood, Matthew, 2017. "Ideas, institutions and interests in the politics of cross-border electricity interconnection: Greenlink, Britain and Ireland," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 375-385.
    7. repec:aen:journl:ej37-3-keppler is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Rodica Loisel & Corentin Simon, 2021. "Market strategies for large-scale energy storage: Vertical integration versus stand-alone player," Post-Print hal-04475995, HAL.
    9. Malaguzzi Valeri, Laura, 2009. "Welfare and competition effects of electricity interconnection between Ireland and Great Britain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4679-4688, November.
    10. Brennan, Noreen & van Rensburg, Thomas M., 2020. "Public preferences for wind farms involving electricity trade and citizen engagement in Ireland," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    11. Pellini, Elisabetta, 2012. "Measuring the impact of market coupling on the Italian electricity market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 322-333.
    12. McInerney, Celine & Bunn, Derek, 2013. "Valuation anomalies for interconnector transmission rights," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 565-578.
    13. Williams, Olayinka & Green, Richard, 2022. "Electricity storage and market power," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    14. Reinhard Haas & Claudia Kemfert & Hans Auer & Amela Ajanovic & Marlene Sayer & Albert Hiesl, 2022. "On the economics of storage for electricity: Current state and future market design prospects," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), May.
    15. Karsten Neuhoff & Sophia Rüster & Sebastian Schwenen, 2015. "Power Market Design beyond 2020: Time to Revisit Key Elements?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1456, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    16. De Vivero-Serrano, Gustavo & Bruninx, Kenneth & Delarue, Erik, 2019. "Implications of bid structures on the offering strategies of merchant energy storage systems," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 251(C), pages 1-1.
    17. Megy, Camille & Massol, Olivier, 2023. "Is Power-to-Gas always beneficial? The implications of ownership structure," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    18. Kristiansen, Tarjei, 2007. "An assessment of the Danish-German cross-border auctions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 3369-3382, June.
    19. Waterson, Michael, 2017. "The characteristics of electricity storage, renewables and markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 466-473.
    20. Martin Weibelzahl & Alexandra Märtz, 2020. "Optimal storage and transmission investments in a bilevel electricity market model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 911-940, April.
    21. Ochoa, Camila & van Ackere, Ann, 2015. "Winners and losers of market coupling," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 522-534.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q47 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Energy Forecasting

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:455. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jane Snape (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dewaruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.