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Was bringt uns die große Koalition? Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik

  • Björn Kauder

    ()

  • Benjamin Larin
  • Niklas Potrafke

    ()

Deutschland wurde bereits zweimal, 1966–1969 und 2005–2009, von einer großen Koalition regiert. Deskriptive Zeitreihenanalysen wirtschaftspolitischer Kennzahlen zeigen nicht auf, dass es unter diesen großen Koalitionen signifikante Kurswechsel in der Wirtschaftspolitik gab. Qualitative Analysen zeigen jedoch, dass die erste große Koalition1966-1969 die Staatstätigkeit ausgeweitet hat. Mit der im Dezember 2013 ins Amt gewählten Koalition scheint es ähnlich zu sein: Der Wechsel des Koalitionspartners derCDU/CSU von der FDP zur SPD lässt deutlich expansivere Wirtschaftspolitiken und eine Ausweitung der Staatstätigkeit erwarten.

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Paper provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its series Ifo Working Paper Series with number Ifo Working Paper No. 172.

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Date of creation: 2014
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_172
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