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Teachers' Desired Mobility to Disadvantaged Schools: Do Financial Incentives Matter?

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  • Julien Silhol
  • Lionel Wilner

Abstract

This paper exploits a 2018 reform of teachers’ financial incentives to work in some French disadvantaged schools. Based on this quasi-natural experiment, it evaluates the impact of those incentives on teachers’ stated preferences to move to such schools. Using data from the internal human resource management of some educational authority, we find that most responsive teachers have less experience and work already in those areas. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the policy has not hurt other disadvantaged schools, but rather induced some teachers not to remain in their current school or to opt less for regular schools.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Silhol & Lionel Wilner, 2022. "Teachers' Desired Mobility to Disadvantaged Schools: Do Financial Incentives Matter?," CESifo Working Paper Series 9906, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9906
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet & Yinghua He, 2019. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1486-1529, April.
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    5. Torberg Falch, 2011. "Teacher Mobility Responses to Wage Changes: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 460-465, May.
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    7. Raj Chetty & John N. Friedman & Jonah E. Rockoff, 2014. "Measuring the Impacts of Teachers I: Evaluating Bias in Teacher Value-Added Estimates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2593-2632, September.
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    9. Corinne Prost, 2013. "Teacher Mobility: Can Financial Incentives Help Disadvantaged Schools to Retain Their Teachers?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 111-112, pages 171-191.
    10. Magali Beffy & Laurent Davezies, 2013. "Has the "Ambition Success Networks" Educational Program Achieved its Ambition?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 111-112, pages 271-293.
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    12. Cowan, James & Goldhaber, Dan, 2018. "Do bonuses affect teacher staffing and student achievement in high poverty schools? Evidence from an incentive for national board certified teachers in Washington State," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 138-152.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    teacher mobility; financial incentives; stated preferences; rank-ordered choices; disadvantaged schools;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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