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Rules, Preferences and Evolution from the Family Angle

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  • Alessandro Cigno

Abstract

This paper reviews the literature concerning the evolution of cultural traits in general and preferences in particular, and the emergence and persistence of rules or norms, from a family per-spective. In models where every new person is effectively the clone of an existing one (either a parent or anyone else), there may be evolution only in the demographic sense that the share of the population who hold a certain trait increases or decreases. Evolution in the strict sense of new traits making their appearance occurs in models where the trait characterizing any given member of any given generation is a combination of traits drawn at random from those represented in the previous generation. Preferences may be altruistic or non-altruistic, but individuals may behave as if they were altruistic even if they are not, because a rule or norm may make it in their interest to do so. Evolutionary stability and renegotiation proofness play analogous roles, the former by selecting altruistic preferences, and the latter by selecting cooperation-inducing rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Cigno, 2021. "Rules, Preferences and Evolution from the Family Angle," CESifo Working Paper Series 9226, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9226
    as

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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp9226.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ogaki, Masao & Zhang, Qiang, 2001. "Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion and Tests of Risk Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 515-526, March.
    2. Giuseppe Albanese & Guido Blasio & Paolo Sestito, 2016. "My parents taught Me. Evidence on the family transmission of values," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 29(2), pages 571-592, April.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement versus Specialized Enforcement," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 1078-1122.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    evolution; preferences; family rules; social norms; socialization; matching; hold-up problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

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