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Inverse Campaigning

Author

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  • Kai A. Konrad

Abstract

It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A’s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose much and do not benefit small groups of voters who win much.

Suggested Citation

  • Kai A. Konrad, 2003. "Inverse Campaigning," CESifo Working Paper Series 905, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_905
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    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo_wp905.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Glazer, Amihai & Konrad, Kai A., 1993. "The evaluation of risky projects by voters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 377-390, October.
    2. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
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    4. Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Hess, Gregory D., 1996. "A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 209-229, December.
    5. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-651, June.
    6. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
    7. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    8. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-424, June.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:01:p:49-61_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barbaro, Salvatore & Suedekum, Jens, 2006. "Reforming a complicated income tax system: The political economy perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 41-59, March.
    2. Pastine, Ivan & Pastine, Tuvana, 2012. "Incumbency advantage and political campaign spending limits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 20-32.
    3. Michael Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper Vries, 2012. "Contests with rank-order spillovers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 315-350, October.
    4. Jan Brueckner & Kangoh Lee, 2015. "Negative campaigning in a probabilistic voting model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 379-399, September.
    5. Seel, Christian, 2013. "The Value of Information in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79930, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Barbaro, Salvatore & Suedekum, Jens, 2005. "The Interaction of Tax Exemptions and Individual Tax Reform Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 1543, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Konrad, Kai Andreas & Kovenock, Daniel J., 2005. "Equilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-war
      [Gleichgewicht und Effizienz im "Tug of War"]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-14, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    8. Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007. "Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February.
    9. Sweder J. G. van Wijnbergen & Tim Willems, 2016. "Learning Dynamics and Support for Economic Reforms: Why Good News Can Be Bad," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 30(1), pages 1-23.
    10. Seel, Christian, 2014. "The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 330-338.
    11. Salvatore Barbaro & Jens Suedekum, 2009. "Voting on income tax exemptions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 239-253, January.
    12. David Reiffen, 2007. "THE EFFECT OF GROUP SIZE AND ASYMMETRIES ON THE INCENTIVE TO REVEAL GROUP-SPECIFIC INFORMATION -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 739-769, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    inverse campaigning; information; voting; policy design;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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