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Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Gharad Bryan
  • Jonathan de Quidt
  • Tom Wilkening
  • Nitin Yadav

Abstract

Small farms and fragmented plots are hallmarks of agriculture in less-developed countries, and there is evidence of high returns to land consolidation and reallocation. Complementarities, holdout and asymmetric information mean that private trade will be slow to reallocate land, and imply that market design has the potential to contribute to the development process. Complexity concerns are, however, paramount. We present results from a framed field experiment with Kenyan farmers, comparing the performance of several continuous-time land exchanges. Farmers are able to achieve high degrees of efficiency, and to comprehend and gain from a relatively complicated package exchange.

Suggested Citation

  • Gharad Bryan & Jonathan de Quidt & Tom Wilkening & Nitin Yadav, 2017. "Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 6557, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6557
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Margarita Gáfaro & César Mantilla, 2019. "Preferences, Uncertainty, and Biases in Land Division: A Bargaining Experiment in the Field," Borradores de Economia 1092, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    2. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    3. Gáfaro, Margarita & Mantilla, César, 2020. "Land division: A lab-in-the-field bargaining experiment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    4. Simon Finster, 2023. "Selling Multiple Complements with Packaging Costs," Papers 2306.14247, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    market design; field experiments; economic development; land trade;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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