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Package Auctions and Exchanges

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  • Paul Milgrom

Abstract

We report recent advances concerning the package allocation problem, in which traders seek to buy or sell combinations of goods. The problems are most difficult when some goods are not substitutes. In that case, competitive equilibrium typically fail to exist but the core is non-empty and comprises the competitive solutions. Also in that case, the Vickrey auction fails to select core allocations and yield revenues that are less than competitive. The Ausubel-Milgrom auction generally selects core allocations and, when goods are substitutes, prescribes the Vickrey allocation. We also evaluate the problems and promise of mechanisms for the package exchange problem. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Milgrom, 2007. "Package Auctions and Exchanges," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 935-965, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:75:y:2007:i:4:p:935-965
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00778.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Package Assignment," Working Papers 2013:43, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    2. repec:oup:oxford:v:33:y:2017:i:4:p:541-571. is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Kan Takeuchi & John Lin & Yan Chen & Thomas Finholt, 2010. "Scheduling with package auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(4), pages 476-499, December.
    4. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    5. Kagel, John H. & Lien, Yuanchuan & Milgrom, Paul, 2014. "Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 210-231.
    6. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2014. "An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements," Discussion Papers 14/06, Department of Economics, University of York.
    7. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," Working Papers 10-14, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    8. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2015. "Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information," MPRA Paper 62388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Multi-Battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 12-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    10. Peter Cramton, 2013. "Spectrum Auction Design," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
    11. Paul Milgrom, 2009. "Assignment Messages and Exchanges," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 95-113, August.
    12. Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu, 2016. "An Efficient and Strategy-Proof Double-Track Auction for Substitutes and Complements," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 523, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

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