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Domestic Abuse: Instrumental Violence and Economics Incentives

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  • Dan Anderberg
  • Helmut Rainer

Abstract

A large fraction of domestically abused women report that their partners interfere with their participation in education and employment. As of yet, mainstream economics has not dealt in any systematic way with this phenomenon and its implications for welfare policy. This paper puts forward a theoretical framework that rationalizes why men may use violence “instrumentally” to prevent their partners from entering employment or from increasing hours of work. The model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the gender wage gap and domestic violence. We explore the implication of this result in the context of various welfare policies. There are unlikely to be any magic bullets or one-size-fit-all solutions when it comes to reducing the incidence of domestic violence. Instead, specific measures and incentives may have to be targeted at different types of households.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Anderberg & Helmut Rainer, 2011. "Domestic Abuse: Instrumental Violence and Economics Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 3673, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3673
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chegere, Martin J. & Karamagi, Innocent John, 2020. "Intimate Partner Violence and Labour Market Outcomes in Tanzania," African Journal of Economic Review, African Journal of Economic Review, vol. 8(2), July.
    2. Nicholas W. Papageorge & Gwyn C. Pauley & Mardge Cohen & Tracey E. Wilson & Barton H. Hamilton & Robert A. Pollak, 2021. "Health, Human Capital, and Domestic Violence," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(4), pages 997-1030.
    3. Inés Berniell & Dolores de la Mata & Matilde Pinto Machado, 2020. "The Impact of a Permanent Income Shock on the Situation of Women in the Household: The Case of a Pension Reform in Argentina," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(4), pages 1295-1343.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    instrumental partner-violence; non-cooperative family decision-making; welfare policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other

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