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Economic abuse: A theory of intrahousehold sabotage

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  • Anderberg, Dan
  • Rainer, Helmut

Abstract

While research on domestic abuse in economics has to date almost exclusively focused on physical violence, research in other disciplines has documented that abusive males frequently also use sabotage tactics to interfere with the employability and job performance of the victim. This paper puts forward a theoretical framework that rationalizes why men may use labor market sabotage “instrumentally” to thwart their partners' training or career efforts. The model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the gender wage gap and intrahousehold sabotage committed by abusive males. There are no one-size-fit-all solutions when it comes to reducing the incidence of economic abuse. Instead, specific measures have to be targeted at different types of households.

Suggested Citation

  • Anderberg, Dan & Rainer, Helmut, 2013. "Economic abuse: A theory of intrahousehold sabotage," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 282-295.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:97:y:2013:i:c:p:282-295 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.10.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Amanda Gosling & Maria D. C. Garcia-Alonso, 2015. "Endogenous divorce and human capital production," Studies in Economics 1521, School of Economics, University of Kent.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic abuse; Intrahousehold sabotage; Non-cooperative family decision-making; Welfare policy;

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other

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