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Disorganization and Financial Collapse

  • Dalia Marin
  • Monika Schnitzer

Recently, Blanchard and Kremer (BK) argued that disorganization has led to the output decline in the former Soviet Union. In this paper we introduce liquidity and credit constraints into the BK model and show how these problems can alleviate the hold-up problem. We argue further that barter creates a hostage which allows to deal with disorganization when credit enforcement is prohibitively costly. The theory helps to explain how the three observed phenomena of output decline, inter-firms arrears and barter in transition economies are connected. Based on a survey of 165 barter deals in the Ukraine in 1997, we reproduce the BK result with firm level and deal specific data and we show that in addition to the input shortage the financial shortage and barter have each an important effect on output growth.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2000/wp-cesifo-2000-09/cesifo_wp339.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 339.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_339
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  1. Johnson, Simon & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999. "Contract Enforcement in Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 2081, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Roland, Gérard & Verdier, Thierry, 1997. "Transition and the Output Fall," CEPR Discussion Papers 1636, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Konings, Jozef & Walsh, Patrick Paul, 1998. "Disorganization in the Transition Process: Firm-Level Evidence from Ukraine," CEPR Discussion Papers 1928, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Dalia Marin, 2002. "Trust versus illusion: What is driving demonetization in the former Soviet Union?," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 10(1), pages 173-200, March.
  5. Marin, Dalia & Kaufmann, Daniel & Gorochowskij, Bogdan, 2000. "Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations Confront Ukrainian Data," Discussion Papers in Economics 63, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Dalia Marin & Monika Schnitzer, 2003. "Creating Creditworthiness through Reciprocal Trade," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 159-174, February.
  7. Ickes, B.W. & Ryterman, R., 1993. "Roadblock to Economic Reform: Inter-Enterprise Debt and the Transition to Markets," Papers 2-93-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  8. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521480505 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Perotti, E. C., 1998. "Inertial credit and opportunistic arrears in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1703-1725, November.
  10. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. "The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 889-906, August.
  11. J. Rostowski, 1993. "The inter-enterprise debt explosion in the former Soviet Union: causes, consequences, cures," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20968, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  12. Blanchard, Olivier & Kremer, Michael R., 1997. "Disorganization," Scholarly Articles 3659691, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. Guillermo Calvo & Fabrizio Coricelli, 1992. "Output Collapse in Eastern Europe: The Role of Credit," IMF Working Papers 92/64, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Wendy Carlin & Steven Fries & Mark Schaffer & Paul Seabright, 2000. "Barter and non-monetary transactions in transition economies: Evidence from a cross-country survey," Working Papers 50, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
  15. Marin, Dalia & Schnitzer, Monika, 1997. "The Economic Institution of International Barter," CEPR Discussion Papers 1658, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Dalia Marin & Monika Schnitzer, 2002. "Contracts in Trade and Transition: The Resurgence of Barter," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262133997, June.
  17. Canice Prendergast & Lars Stole, 2001. "Barter, Liquidity and Market Segmentation," CESifo Working Paper Series 586, CESifo Group Munich.
  18. Marin, Dalia & Schnitzer, Monika, 1995. "Tying Trade Flows: A Theory of Countertrade with Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1047-64, December.
  19. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Maskin, Eric S, 1996. "A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 955-1005, November.
  20. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Eric S. Maskin, 1996. "A Walrasian Theory of Money," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1753, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  21. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September.
  22. J Rostowski, 1993. "The Inter-Enterprise Debt Explosion in the Former Soviet Union: Causes, Consequences, Cures," CEP Discussion Papers dp0142, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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