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Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision

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  • Mattias Polborn

Abstract

Consider a setting in which several groups of individuals with common interests (“clubs”) compete with each other for recognition by other individuals. Depending on the context, recognition may be expressed by these other individuals joining a club, or choosing one club to admire. Clubs compete by providing a public good. Some examples for applications of this model include: (i) Churches missionarizing to attract new members; (ii) Open-source software projects and Wikipedia; (iii) professors of an economics department competing to attract graduate students to their respective fields; (iv) artists and researchers aiming for recognition of their work by their peers and the public. Competition between clubs increases the public good provision level, and a sufficiently strong competition effect may even lead to overprovision.

Suggested Citation

  • Mattias Polborn, 2007. "Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision," CESifo Working Paper Series 1920, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1920
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    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1920.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Casini & Lore Vandewalle & Zaki Wahhaj, 2017. "Public Good Provision in Indian Rural Areas: The Returns to Collective Action by Microfinance Groups," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 31(1), pages 97-128.
    2. Lacetera, Nicola & Macis, Mario, 2010. "Social image concerns and prosocial behavior: Field evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 225-237, November.
    3. Lacetera, Nicola & Macis, Mario & Slonim, Robert, 2009. "Will There Be Blood? Incentives and Substitution Effects in Pro-social Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 4567, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Lacetera, Nicola & Macis, Mario, 2008. "Social Image Concerns and Pro-Social Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 3771, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Lacetera, Nicola & Macis, Mario, 2008. "Motivating Altruism: A Field Study," IZA Discussion Papers 3770, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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    Keywords

    public goods; private provision; clubs; competition;

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