Limiting the number of charities
We consider a model where creating a charity implies a fixed cost and individual contributions depend on how close donors feel with respect to the charity. In that setting we show that there are an optimal number of charities and an optimal rate of subsidization that depend on the set-up cost and on the attachment of donors to charities that share the same values as theirs. We also consider the case of free-entry and compare it with the second-best solution controlling for the number of charities.
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- Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1995.
"On the Number and Size of Nations,"
NBER Working Papers
5050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aldashev, Gani & Verdier, Thierry, 2007. "NGO Competition and the Markets for Development Donations," CEPR Discussion Papers 6350, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barla, P. & Pestieau, P., 2005.
"The Optimal Number of Charities,"
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