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Hypocrisy in a Simple Social Interaction Model

Author

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  • Mikhail Anufriev
  • Kirill Borisov
  • Mikhail Pakhnin

Abstract

We develop a model of social interaction in which agents hold private beliefs but communicate public statements. We distinguish between two networks: an audience network shaping statements through social pressure, and an influence network governing belief updating. This separation drives a wedge between public statements and underlying beliefs, so that agents may persistently communicate opinions they do not hold. We provide necessary and sufficient network conditions for the emergence of such hypocrisy. The model generates rich patterns of opinion propagation, including the amplification of messages that agents themselves do not believe, and sheds light on phenomena such as propaganda diffusion, the spiral of silence, and political correctness.

Suggested Citation

  • Mikhail Anufriev & Kirill Borisov & Mikhail Pakhnin, 2026. "Hypocrisy in a Simple Social Interaction Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 12700, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12700
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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