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Unequal Climate Policy in an Unequal World

Author

Listed:
  • Elisa Belfiori
  • Daniel Carroll
  • Sewon Hur

Abstract

We characterize optimal climate policy in an economy with heterogeneous households and non-homothetic preferences. We focus on constrained efficiency, where the planner is restricted from transferring resources across households. We derive three results. First, the constrained-optimal carbon tax is heterogeneous and progressive. Second, if restricted to a uniform tax, the optimal rate is lower than the standard Pigouvian level due to inequality. Third, this allocation is decentralizable using only uniform instruments - a carbon tax, clean subsidy, and a lumpsum transfer. In a quantitative application, we show this policy generates a Pareto improvement, reconciling climate efficiency with inequality concerns.

Suggested Citation

  • Elisa Belfiori & Daniel Carroll & Sewon Hur, 2026. "Unequal Climate Policy in an Unequal World," CESifo Working Paper Series 12443, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12443
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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