IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_12358.html

Making the Cut: Close Elections and Local Welfare Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Nikolaj Broberg
  • Tuuli Tähtinen

  • Thomas Walsh

Abstract

Welfare benefit sanctions are a common tool in many social insurance systems. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, we investigate how representatives’ political alignment influences the implementation of a new sanction regime in the UK. Our results show that constituencies aligned with the Conservative-led central government experience significantly fewer sanctions. The RD estimate indicates a drop of 0.8 percentage points, implying 18 % lower sanction rates in central government controlled constituencies. These findings demonstrate that partisan alignment can systematically shape the local implementation of a national, rule-based policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolaj Broberg & Tuuli Tähtinen & Thomas Walsh, 2025. "Making the Cut: Close Elections and Local Welfare Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 12358, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12358
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp12358.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brian Knight, 2008. "Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1785-1803, October.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Francesco Giavazzi, 2012. "Introduction to "Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis"," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, pages 1-18, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Brassiolo, Pablo & Estrada, Ricardo & Fajardo, Gustavo, 2020. "My (running) mate, the mayor: Political ties and access to public sector jobs in Ecuador," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    4. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2021. "Appointed public officials and local favoritism: Evidence from the German states," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    5. Anna Stansbury & Dan Turner & Ed Balls, 2023. "Tackling the UK’s regional economic inequality: binding constraints and avenues for policy intervention," Contemporary Social Science, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(3-4), pages 318-356, August.
    6. repec:osf:socarx:d42xq_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Kaba, Mustafa, 2022. "Who buys vote-buying? How, how much, and at what cost?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 98-124.
    8. Hahn, Jinyong & Todd, Petra & Van der Klaauw, Wilbert, 2001. "Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 201-209, January.
    9. Mitra Akhtari & Diana Moreira & Laura Trucco, 2022. "Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 442-493, February.
    10. Brassiolo, Pablo & Estrada, Ricardo & Fajardo, Gustavo, 2020. "My (Running) Mate, the Mayor: Political Ties and Access to Public Jobs in Ecuador," Research Department working papers 1521, CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Barbosa, Klenio & Ferreira, Fernando, 2023. "Occupy government: Democracy and the dynamics of personnel decisions and public finances," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    2. Liu, Kevin Zhengcheng & Zhang, Xiaoming, 2025. "Discretion, talent allocation, and governance performance: Evidence from China’s imperial bureaucracy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    3. Luisa Schneider & Daniela Wech & Matthias Wrede, 2022. "Political alignment and project funding," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(6), pages 1561-1589, December.
    4. Callen, Mike & Gulzarz, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Rezaeek, Arman, 2023. "The political economy of public sector absence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 117390, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Jörg L. Spenkuch & Edoardo Teso & Guo Xu, 2023. "Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1171-1203, July.
    6. Pedro Forquesato, 2022. "Who Benefits from Political Connections in Brazilian Municipalities," Papers 2204.09450, arXiv.org.
    7. Olle Folke & Linna Martin & Johanna Rickne & Matz Dahlberg, 2021. "Politicians' neighbourhoods: Where do they live and does it matter?," Discussion Papers 2021-03, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    8. Resce, Giuliano & Vaquero-Piñeiro, Cristina, 2024. "Political favouritism and inefficient management: Policy-makers’ birth town bias in EU quality certifications," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 683-702.
    9. Callen, Michael & Gulzar, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Rezaee, Arman, 2023. "The political economy of public sector absence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    10. Diegmann, André & Pohlan, Laura & Weber, Andrea, 2024. "Do Politicians Affect Firm Outcomes? Evidence from Connections to the German Federal Parliament," IZA Discussion Papers 17031, IZA Network @ LISER.
    11. Kong, Dongmin & Pan, Yue & Tian, Gary Gang & Zhang, Pengdong, 2020. "CEOs' hometown connections and access to trade credit: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    12. Francesca Carta & Lucia Rizzica, 2015. "Female employment and pre-kindergarten: on the uninteded effects of an Italian reform," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1030, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    13. Dong, Yingying, 2010. "Jumpy or Kinky? Regression Discontinuity without the Discontinuity," MPRA Paper 25461, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Rahul Singh & Moses Stewart, 2025. "Placebo Discontinuity Design," Papers 2507.12693, arXiv.org.
    15. Anil Kumar, 2018. "Do Restrictions on Home Equity Extraction Contribute to Lower Mortgage Defaults? Evidence from a Policy Discontinuity at the Texas Border," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 268-297, February.
    16. Frölich, Markus & Lechner, Michael, 2010. "Exploiting Regional Treatment Intensity for the Evaluation of Labor Market Policies," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 105(491), pages 1014-1029.
    17. Hans R. A. Koster & Jos N. van Ommeren & Piet Rietveld, 2016. "Historic amenities, income and sorting of households," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 203-236.
    18. Jan K. Brueckner & Steven G. Craig & Kangoh Lee, 2019. "Samuelson Meets Federalism: Local Production of a National Public Good," CESifo Working Paper Series 7709, CESifo.
    19. Ivan A Canay & Vishal Kamat, 2018. "Approximate Permutation Tests and Induced Order Statistics in the Regression Discontinuity Design," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(3), pages 1577-1608.
    20. Gianmarco Daniele & Amedeo Piolatto & Willem Sas, 2018. "Who Sent You? Strategic Voting, Transfers and Bailouts in a Federation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2018-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12358. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.