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Declining Free Lunch: State Capacity and Foregone Public Spending

Author

Listed:
  • Sarah Fritz
  • Lorenzo Incoronato
  • Catherine van der List

Abstract

This paper documents substantial fiscal waste in the context of one the world’s largest regional development programs - the EU Cohesion Policy. We study Italy, and find that 20% of funding commitments are never paid out and funneled into unfinished or never-started projects. In our setting, this happens for reasons unrelated to fiscal constraints - municipalities appear to simply leave money on the table. Foregone spending is more prevalent in Southern regions, but there is also stark variation across municipalities within regions. We show that such under-utilization of available funds is strongly associated with limited administrative capacity of local governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Sarah Fritz & Lorenzo Incoronato & Catherine van der List, 2025. "Declining Free Lunch: State Capacity and Foregone Public Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series 12126, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12126
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy

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