The Stimulative Effect of an Unconditional Block Grant on the Decentralized Provision of Care
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- Mark Kattenberg & Wouter Vermeulen, 2015. "The stimulative effect of an unconditional block grant on the decentralized provision of care," CPB Discussion Paper 308, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
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- Rudy Douven & Pieter Bakx & Frederik T. Schut, 2016. "Does independent needs assessment limit supply-side moral hazard in long-term care?," CPB Discussion Paper 327, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
More about this item
Keywordsintergovernmental transfers; flypaper effect; decentralization of health care;
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
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