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Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralised Public Spending

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Bergvall
  • Claire Charbit
  • Dirk-Jan Kraan
  • Olaf Merk

Abstract

Intergovernmental grants are used in many countries to finance subnational spending and to implement national policies. However, the governance of grants is complex, and practices vary widely across OECD countries. The aim of this article is to provide a study of grant design that will be useful to policy makers. The article attempts to integrate both theoretical and empirical insights from the fiscal federalism literature as well as information obtained directly from practitioners concerning their experiences with the implementation of different types of grants. A typology of grants is presented, as well as an overview of the purposes of grants. The article concludes with some principles of grant design and implementation issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Bergvall & Claire Charbit & Dirk-Jan Kraan & Olaf Merk, 2006. "Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralised Public Spending," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 5(4), pages 111-158.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:govkaa:5l9k4g83wkf1
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/budget-v5-art24-en
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    Cited by:

    1. Meloni, Osvaldo, 2016. "Turning a blind eye to policy prescriptions. Exploring the sources of procyclical fiscal behavior at subnational level," MPRA Paper 70541, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Köppl Turyna, Monika & Kula, Grzegorz & Balmas, Agata & Waclawska, Kamila, 2015. "The effects of fiscal autonomy on the size of public sector and the strength of political budget cycles in local expenditure," MPRA Paper 64202, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Luque, Carlos A. & Haddad, Eduardo A. & Lima, Gilberto T. & Sakurai, Sergio N. & Costa, Silvio M., 2011. "Impact assessment of interregional government transfers in Brazil: an input-output approach," MPRA Paper 31292, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. repec:kap:iaecre:v:17:y:2011:i:2:p:134-156 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Yongzheng Liu, 2011. "Designing the Local Government Enhancement Fund for the Philippines," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1120, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Riemer P. Faber & Pierre Koning, 2017. "Why not fully spend a conditional block grant?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(1), pages 60-95, February.
    7. Mark Kattenberg & Wouter Vermeulen, 2015. "The stimulative effect of an unconditional block grant on the decentralized provision of care," CPB Discussion Paper 308, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    8. Hansjörg Blöchliger & Claire Charbit, 2008. "Fiscal equalisation," OECD Journal: Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2008(1), pages 1-22.
    9. Abbott, Andrew & Jones, Philip, 2012. "Intergovernmental transfers and procyclical public spending," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 447-451.
    10. Johann Bröthaler & Michael Getzner, 2011. "Fiscal Autonomy and Total Government Expenditure: An Austrian Case-study," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 17(2), pages 134-156, May.
    11. Katarina Elofsson, 2011. "Delegation of Decision-Rights for Wetlands," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(2), pages 285-303, October.
    12. Karolina Kaiser & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2013. "The timing of elections in federations: a disciplining device against soft budget constraints?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 197-215, March.
    13. Ernesto Longobardi, 2011. "From transfers to tax "co-occupation": the Italian reform of intergovernmental finance," SERIES 0038, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Dec 2011.
    14. Leonardo Villar & Natalia Salazar Ferro & Mary Simpson & Martha Delgado & Roberto Steiner & Juan Gonzalo Zapata & Orlando Gracia & Carlos Antonio Mesa, 2016. "Sistema General de Participaciones y su vínculo con las políticas e incentivos dirigidos a la excelencia docente y el mejoramiento continuo de la calidad de la educación," INFORMES DE INVESTIGACIÓN 014442, FEDESARROLLO.
    15. repec:kap:itaxpf:v:25:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10797-017-9442-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00492085 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Andrew Abbott & Philip Jones, 2013. "Procyclical government spending: a public choice analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 243-258, March.
    18. M. Rose Olfert, 2016. "Regional Inequality and Decentralized Governance: Canada's Provinces," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 46(3), pages 201-222, Winter.
    19. Nazaré Costa Cabral, 2016. "Which Budgetary Union for the E(M)U?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(6), pages 1280-1295, November.
    20. Gerard Turley & Darragh Flannery & Stephen McNena, 2015. "A Needs and Resources Assessment of Fiscal Equalisation in the Irish Local Government System," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 46(3), pages 459-484.

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