Renegotiating Performance: the Role of Performance Pay in Renegotiating the Effort Bargain
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- Marsden, David, 2003. "Renegotiating performance: the role of performance pay in renegotiating the effort bargain," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3634, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
References listed on IDEAS
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"Motivation and performance related pay in the public sector: a case study of the Inland Revenue,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
3647, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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More about this item
- J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics
- R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns
- J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-12-07 (All new papers)
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