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Argentina vs Holdouts. The Complete Saga (2005-2016)

Author

Listed:
  • Rosario Bustillo
  • Tomás A. Marinozzi

Abstract

This paper provides a deep analysis into the legal dispute between Argentina and the holdouts as a consequence of the 2001 sovereign default. This paper highlights how the legal conict helped uncover fundamental issues in the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). Questions re- garding overarching injunctions, ambiguous interpretation of boilerplate clauses and the arguable judicial overreach of foreign court lead to necessary changes on standard clauses in sovereign debt contracts. A multidisciplinary approach combining aspects of law and economics was applied in order to fully appreciate the complexity of the subject, as well as the impact this particular case had on posterior sovereign debt contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosario Bustillo & Tomás A. Marinozzi, 2022. "Argentina vs Holdouts. The Complete Saga (2005-2016)," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 831, Universidad del CEMA.
    • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:831
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chuck Fang & Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch, 2021. "Restructuring Sovereign Bonds: Holdouts, Haircuts and the Effectiveness of CACs," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(1), pages 155-196, March.
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    3. Guzman Martin & Heymann Daniel, 2015. "The IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis: Issues and Problems," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 387-404, December.
    4. Stasavage, David, 2016. "What we can learn from the early history of sovereign debt," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 1-16.
    5. Kay Chung & Michael G. Papaioannou, 2021. "Do Enhanced Collective Action Clauses Affect Sovereign Borrowing Costs?," Journal of Banking and Financial Economics, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 1(15), pages 59-87, October.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)

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