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The Capital Levy in Theory and Practice

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  • Eichengreen, Barry

Abstract

A capital levy is a one-time tax on all wealth holders with the goal of retiring public debt. This paper reconsiders the historical debate over the capital levy in a contingent capital taxation framework. This shows how in theory the imposition of a levy can be welfare improving when adopted to redress debt problems created by special circumstances, even if its nonrecurrence cannot be guaranteed. If the contingencies in response to which the levy is imposed are fully anticipated, independently verifiable and not under government control, then saving and investment should not fall following the imposition of the levy, nor should the government find it more difficult to raise revenues subsequently. In practice, serious problems stand in the way of implementation. A capital levy has profound distribution consequences. Property owners are sure to resist its adoption. In a democratic society, their objections are guaranteed to cause delay. This provides an opportunity for capital flight, reducing the prospective yield, and allows the special circumstances providing the justification for the levy to recede in the past. The only successful levies occur in cases like post-World War II Japan, where important elements of the democratic process are suppressed and where the fact that the levy was imposed by an outside power minimized the negative impact on the reputation of subsequent sovereign governments.
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Suggested Citation

  • Eichengreen, Barry, 1989. "The Capital Levy in Theory and Practice," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt11j4756b, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt11j4756b
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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Why Wealth Taxes Are Not Enough
      by Kenneth Rogoff in Project Syndicate on 2013-11-04 21:51:59

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nick O'Donovan, 2021. "One‐off wealth taxes: theory and evidence," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(3-4), pages 565-597, September.
    2. Giovannini, Alberto & Hines Jr, James R, 1990. "Capital Flight and Tax Competition: Are there Viable Solutions to Both Problems," CEPR Discussion Papers 416, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. D’Erasmo, P. & Mendoza, E.G. & Zhang, J., 2016. "What is a Sustainable Public Debt?," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2493-2597, Elsevier.
    4. Thomas R. Michl, 2013. "Public debt, growth, and distribution," Review of Keynesian Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 120-144, January.
    5. Keiichiro Kobayashi & Kozo Ueda, 2017. "Secular Stagnation under the Fear of a Government Debt Disaster," CIGS Working Paper Series 17-012E, The Canon Institute for Global Studies.
    6. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    7. Keiichiro Kobayashi & Kozo Ueda, 2022. "Secular Stagnation and Low Interest Rates under the Fear of a Government Debt Crisis," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(4), pages 779-824, June.
    8. Peter Spahn, 2016. "Central Bank Design in a Non-optimal Currency Union A Lender of Last Resort for Government Debt?," ROME Working Papers 201610, ROME Network.
    9. Stuart Adam & Helen Miller, 2021. "The economic arguments for and against a wealth tax," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(3-4), pages 457-483, September.
    10. Kempkes, Gerhard & Stähler, Nikolai, 2014. "A one-off wealth levy? Assessing the pros, the cons and the importance of credibility," Discussion Papers 29/2014, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    11. Mykhailo Sverdan, 2022. "Lump-Sum Tax Is An Alternative To Wealth Taxation," Three Seas Economic Journal, Publishing house "Baltija Publishing", vol. 3(4).
    12. Mario Sarcinelli, 2012. "Euro crisis or public debt crisis? With a remedy for the latter case," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 65(262), pages 215-236.
    13. Eric French & Elaine Kelly & Gerhard Kempkes & Nikolai Stähler, 2016. "A One‐Off Wealth Levy? Assessing the Pros and Cons and the Importance of Credibility," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 37, pages 821-849, September.

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