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Use of Internal Information, External Information Acquisition and Customs Underreporting

Listed author(s):
  • Cyril CHALENDARD

    ()

This paper identifies opportunities for improving the performance of revenue-collection authorities. To detect and combat fraud, we argue that revenue-collection authorities should, notably in the absence of reliable third-party information, exploit non-usual sources of information. Specifically, our micro-level study of customs evasion provides evidence that using internal or external available sources of information facilitates customs-enforcement. Estimates highlight that exploiting historical data and/or relying on an information provider — a pre-shipment inspection company —significantly reduces observed trade statistics discrepancies. The potential endogeneity of pre-shipment inspections is addressed by using instrumental variables. Robust to a variety of additional checks, findings notably suggest that governments should work on the introduction of an automatic exchange of information system across customs authorities to substantially offset the informational advantage of the importer.

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Paper provided by CERDI in its series Working Papers with number 201522.

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Length: 35
Date of creation: Sep 2015
Publication status: Published in , 01 2017, pages
Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1722
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  1. Levin, Jörgen & Widell, Lars M., 2014. "Tax evasion in Kenya and Tanzania: Evidence from missing imports," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 151-162.
  2. Raymond Fisman & Peter Moustakerski & Shang-Jin Wei, 2008. "Outsourcing Tariff Evasion: A New Explanation for Entrepôt Trade," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 587-592, August.
  3. Javorcik, Beata S. & Narciso, Gaia, 2008. "Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 208-222, December.
  4. Dequiedt, V. & Geourjon, A.-M. & Rota-Graziosi, G., 2012. "Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 282-291.
  5. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Martin B. Knudsen & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Søren Pedersen & Emmanuel Saez, 2011. "Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 651-692, May.
  6. Luc De Wulf & José B. Sokol, 2005. "Customs Modernization Handbook," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7216, April.
  7. Ferrantino, Michael J. & Liu, Xuepeng & Wang, Zhi, 2012. "Evasion behaviors of exporters and importers: Evidence from the U.S.–China trade data discrepancy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 141-157.
  8. Bayer, Ralph & Cowell, Frank, 2009. "Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1131-1143, December.
  9. Lorenzo Rotunno & Pierre-Louis Vézina, 2012. "Chinese Networks and Tariff Evasion," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(12), pages 1772-1794, December.
  10. Dina Pomeranz, 2015. "No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2539-2569, August.
  11. Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Bertrand LAPORTE, 2004. "Risk Management for Targeting Customs Controls in Developing Countries: A Risky Venture for Revenue Performance?," Working Papers 200416, CERDI.
  12. Paul Carrillo & Dina Pomeranz & Monica Singhal, 2017. "Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 144-164, April.
  13. Anson Jose & Cadot Olivier & Olarreaga Marcelo, 2006. "Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-26, December.
  14. Gabriel Zucman, 2013. "The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. net Debtors or net Creditors?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(3), pages 1321-1364.
  15. Gerard McLinden & Enrique Fanta & David Widdowson & Tom Doyle, 2011. "Border Management Modernization," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 2544, April.
  16. Gilles Montagnat-Rentier & Gilles Parent, 2012. "Customs Administration Reform and Modernization in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 1995–2010," IMF Working Papers 12/259, International Monetary Fund.
  17. Supee Teravaninthorn & Gaël Raballand, 2009. "Transport Prices and Costs in Africa : A Review of the International Corridors," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 6610, April.
  18. Andrey Stoyanov, 2012. "Tariff evasion and rules of origin violations under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 45(3), pages 879-902, August.
  19. Sébastien Jean & Cristina Mitaritonna, 2010. "Determinants and Pervasiveness of the Evasion of Customs Duties," Working Papers 2010-26, CEPII research center.
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