Long-term Framework for Electricity Distribution Access Charges
In order to achieve overall economic efficiency, incentive regulation of electricity distribution utilities must address two important and inter-related issues. First, the utilities’ allowed revenues need to be set at correct levels. Second, the access charging mechanism by which the utilities recover the allowed revenues must give the correct economic signals to generation and load connected to the network. This paper is concerned with the latter aspect of regulation. The paper discusses the main economic principles that should form the basis on which a distribution access charging model is developed. The charging model should have a number of attributes: be calibrated to each existing network; contain an asset register; be able to determine assets needed to meet new demand; find least-cost system expansion; compute network losses and handle ancillary services; estimate incremental operating and maintenance costs; be available to users; and be simple enough for external users to understand.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- M. Pollitt, 2004.
"Electricity reform in Chile. Lessons for developing countries,"
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries,
Intersentia, vol. 5(3), pages 221-263, September.
- Pollitt, M.G., 2004. "Electricity Reform in Chile: Lessons for Developing Countries," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0448, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Michael Pollitt, 2004. "Electricity Reform in Chile Lessons for Developing Countries," Working Papers 0416, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
- Filippini, Massimo & Wild, Jorg, 2001. "Regional differences in electricity distribution costs and their consequences for yardstick regulation of access prices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 477-488, July.
- Massimo Filippini & Jörg Wild, 2000. "Regional Differences in Electricity Distribution Costs and their Consequences for Yardstick Regulation of Access Prices," CEPE Working paper series 00-05, CEPE Center for Energy Policy and Economics, ETH Zurich.
- A. Yatchew, 2000. "Scale economies in electricity distribution: a semiparametric analysis," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(2), pages 187-210.
- Greene, David L. & Patterson, Philip D. & Singh, Margaret & Li, Jia, 2005. "Feebates, rebates and gas-guzzler taxes: a study of incentives for increased fuel economy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 757-775, April.
- Brunekreeft, Gert & Neuhoff, Karsten & Newbery, David, 2005. "Electricity transmission: An overview of the current debate," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 73-93, June.
- Brunekreeft, G. & Neuhoff, K. & Newbery, D., 2004. "Electricity transmission: an overview of the current debate," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0463, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Riechmann, Christoph, 2000. "Strategic pricing of grid access under partial price-caps -- electricity distribution in England and Wales," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 187-207, April.
- Chi-Keung Woo & Debra Lloyd-Zannetti & Ren Orans & Brian Horii & Grayson Heffner, 1995. "Marginal Capacity Costs of Electricity Distribution and Demand for Distributed Generation," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 111-130. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0551. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jake Dyer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.