IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cam/camdae/0551.html

Long-term Framework for Electricity Distribution Access Charges

Author

Abstract

In order to achieve overall economic efficiency, incentive regulation of electricity distribution utilities must address two important and inter-related issues. First, the utilities’ allowed revenues need to be set at correct levels. Second, the access charging mechanism by which the utilities recover the allowed revenues must give the correct economic signals to generation and load connected to the network. This paper is concerned with the latter aspect of regulation. The paper discusses the main economic principles that should form the basis on which a distribution access charging model is developed. The charging model should have a number of attributes: be calibrated to each existing network; contain an asset register; be able to determine assets needed to meet new demand; find least-cost system expansion; compute network losses and handle ancillary services; estimate incremental operating and maintenance costs; be available to users; and be simple enough for external users to understand.

Suggested Citation

  • Jamasb, T. & Neuhoff, K. & Newbery, D. & Pollitt, M., 2005. "Long-term Framework for Electricity Distribution Access Charges," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0551, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0551
    Note: EPRG, IO
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/eprg-wp0507.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brunekreeft, Gert & Neuhoff, Karsten & Newbery, David, 2005. "Electricity transmission: An overview of the current debate," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 73-93, June.
    2. Filippini, Massimo & Wild, Jorg, 2001. "Regional differences in electricity distribution costs and their consequences for yardstick regulation of access prices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 477-488, July.
    3. A. Yatchew, 2000. "Scale economies in electricity distribution: a semiparametric analysis," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(2), pages 187-210.
    4. Greene, David L. & Patterson, Philip D. & Singh, Margaret & Li, Jia, 2005. "Feebates, rebates and gas-guzzler taxes: a study of incentives for increased fuel economy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 757-775, April.
    5. Riechmann, Christoph, 2000. "Strategic pricing of grid access under partial price-caps -- electricity distribution in England and Wales," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 187-207, April.
    6. Greene, David L. & Patterson, Philip D. & Singh, Margaret & Li, Jia, 2005. "Corrigendum to "Feebates, rebates and gas-guzzler taxes: a study of incentives for increased fuel economy" [Energy Policy 33 (2005) 757-775]," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(14), pages 1901-1902, September.
    7. M. Pollitt, 2004. "Electricity reform in Chile. Lessons for developing countries," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 5(3), pages 221-263, September.
    8. Chi-Keung Woo & Debra Lloyd-Zannetti & Ren Orans & Brian Horii & Grayson Heffner, 1995. "Marginal Capacity Costs of Electricity Distribution and Demand for Distributed Generation," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 111-130.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jamasb, Tooraj & Pollitt, Michael, 2008. "Reference models and incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: An evaluation of Sweden's Network Performance Assessment Model (NPAM)," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1788-1801, May.
    2. van der Welle, Adriaan J. & de Joode, Jeroen, 2011. "Regulatory road maps for the integration of intermittent electricity generation: Methodology development and the case of The Netherlands," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(10), pages 5829-5839, October.
    3. Poudineh, Rahmatallah & Jamasb, Tooraj, 2014. "Distributed generation, storage, demand response and energy efficiency as alternatives to grid capacity enhancement," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 222-231.
    4. Brandstätt, Christine & Brunekreeft, Gert & Friedrichsen, Nele, 2011. "Locational signals to reduce network investments in smart distribution grids: What works and what not?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 244-254.
    5. Niesten, Eva, 2010. "Network investments and the integration of distributed generation: Regulatory recommendations for the Dutch electricity industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 4355-4362, August.
    6. Jamasb, Tooraj & Pollitt, Michael, 2008. "Security of supply and regulation of energy networks," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 4584-4589, December.
    7. Eva Niesten, 2010. "Identifying options for regulating the coordination of network investments with investments in distributed electricity generation," CPB Discussion Paper 141, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martin, Elliot & Shaheen, Susan & Lipman, Timothy & Camel, Madonna, 2014. "Evaluating the public perception of a feebate policy in California through the estimation and cross-validation of an ordinal regression model," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 144-153.
    2. Itamar Milrad, 2018. "GREEN TAXATION: THE INFLUENCE AND DESIRABILITY OF THE FEEBATE SCHEME IN THE ISRAELI NEW CAR MARKETIn August 2009, a “green taxation”," Israel Economic Review, Bank of Israel, vol. 16(2), pages 1-36.
    3. Bergantino, Angela S. & Intini, Mario & Percoco, Marco, 2021. "New car taxation and its unintended environmental consequences," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 36-48.
    4. Pearce, Joshua M. & Hanlon, Jason T., 2007. "Energy conservation from systematic tire pressure regulation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 2673-2677, April.
    5. Sprei, Frances & Karlsson, Sten, 2013. "Energy efficiency versus gains in consumer amenities—An example from new cars sold in Sweden," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 490-499.
    6. Richa, Kirti & Babbitt, Callie W. & Gaustad, Gabrielle & Wang, Xue, 2014. "A future perspective on lithium-ion battery waste flows from electric vehicles," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 63-76.
    7. Axsen, Jonn & Mountain, Dean C. & Jaccard, Mark, 2009. "Combining stated and revealed choice research to simulate the neighbor effect: The case of hybrid-electric vehicles," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 221-238, August.
    8. Adamos Adamou & Sofronis Clerides & Theodoros Zachariadis, 2012. "Assessment of CO2-Oriented Vehicle Tax Reforms: A Case Study of Greece," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 04-2012, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    9. Soren T. Anderson & Ian W. H. Parry & James M. Sallee & Carolyn Fischer, 2011. "Automobile Fuel Economy Standards: Impacts, Efficiency, and Alternatives," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 89-108, Winter.
    10. Mandell, Svante, 2009. "Policies towards a more efficient car fleet," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5184-5191, December.
    11. Barla, Philippe & Proost, Stef, 2012. "Energy efficiency policy in a non-cooperative world," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 2209-2215.
    12. Ciccone, Alice, 2018. "Environmental effects of a vehicle tax reform: Empirical evidence from Norway," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 141-157.
    13. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9je5h30d2n is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Wang, Banban & Pizer, William A. & Munnings, Clayton, 2022. "Price limits in a tradable performance standard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    15. Martin, Elliott William, 2009. "New Vehicle Choice, Fuel Economy and Vehicle Incentives: An Analysis of Hybrid Tax Credits and the Gasoline Tax," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt5gd206wv, University of California Transportation Center.
    16. Ajayi, Victor & Weyman-Jones, Thomas & Glass, Anthony, 2017. "Cost efficiency and electricity market structure: A case study of OECD countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 283-291.
    17. Galarraga, Ibon & Abadie, Luis M. & Kallbekken, Steffen, 2016. "Designing incentive schemes for promoting energy-efficient appliances: A new methodology and a case study for Spain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 24-36.
    18. Martin, Elliot William, 2009. "New Vehicle Choices, Fuel Economy and Vehicle Incentives: An Analysis of Hybrid Tax Credits and Gasoline Tax," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt6sz198c2, University of California Transportation Center.
    19. Peters, Anja & Mueller, Michel G. & de Haan, Peter & Scholz, Roland W., 2008. "Feebates promoting energy-efficient cars: Design options to address more consumers and possible counteracting effects," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1355-1365, April.
    20. Parry, Ian W.H., 2012. "Reforming the tax system to promote environmental objectives: An application to Mauritius," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 103-112.
    21. Changzheng Liu and David L. Greene, 2014. "Vehicle Manufacturer Technology Adoption and Pricing Strategies under Fuel Economy/Emissions Standards and Feebates," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0551. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jake Dyer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.