IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/btx/wpaper/1412.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Heterogeneous Responses to Effective Tax Enforcement: Evidence from Spanish Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Miguel Almunia

    (University of Warwick)

  • David Lopez-Rodriguez

    (Banco de España)

Abstract

We investigate whether monitoring the information trails generated by firms’ activities improves tax compliance. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Taxpayers’ Unit (LTU) in Spain, which devotes additional resources to verifying the transactions reported by firms with more than €6 million in reported revenue. Firms bunch below this threshold in order to avoid stricter tax enforcement, and this reaction is stronger in sectors where paper trail is easier to monitor. These results suggest that monitoring efforts by the tax authority and the traceability of information reported by firms are complements, and both are necessary for effective tax enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel Almunia & David Lopez-Rodriguez, 2014. "Heterogeneous Responses to Effective Tax Enforcement: Evidence from Spanish Firms," Working Papers 1412, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    • Handle: RePEc:btx:wpaper:1412
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/series-14/WP1412.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raj Chetty & John N. Friedman & Tore Olsen & Luigi Pistaferri, 2011. "Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(2), pages 749-804.
    2. Bastani, Spencer & Selin, Håkan, 2014. "Bunching and non-bunching at kink points of the Swedish tax schedule," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 36-49.
    3. Emmanuel Saez, 2010. "Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 180-212, August.
    4. Dina Pomeranz, 2015. "No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2539-2569, August.
    5. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2016. "Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(330), pages 219-246, April.
    6. Raj Chetty & John N. Friedman & Emmanuel Saez, 2013. "Using Differences in Knowledge across Neighborhoods to Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 2683-2721, December.
    7. Raj Chetty, 2009. "Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 451-488, May.
    8. Onji, Kazuki, 2009. "The response of firms to eligibility thresholds: Evidence from the Japanese value-added tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 766-775, June.
    9. Christensen, Kevin & Cline, Robert & Neubig, Tom, 2001. "Total Corporate Taxation: "Hidden," Above-the-Line, Non-Income Taxes," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 54(3), pages 495-506, September.
    10. Gordon, Roger & Li, Wei, 2009. "Tax structures in developing countries: Many puzzles and a possible explanation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 855-866, August.
    11. Christensen, Kevin & Cline, Robert & Neubig, Tom, 2001. "Total Corporate Taxation: "Hidden," Above-the-Line, Non-Income Taxes," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 3), pages 495-506, September.
    12. Slemrod, Joel & Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles, 2001. "Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 455-483, March.
    13. Slemrod, Joel, and Christian Gillitzer, 2014. "Tax Systems," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262026724, April.
    14. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Martin B. Knudsen & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Søren Pedersen & Emmanuel Saez, 2011. "Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 651-692, May.
    15. Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, 2006. "Putting Firms into Optimal Tax Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 130-134, May.
    16. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    17. Michael Carlos Best & Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, 2018. "Housing Market Responses to Transaction Taxes: Evidence From Notches and Stimulus in the U.K," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(1), pages 157-193.
    18. Henrik J. Kleven & Mazhar Waseem, 2013. "Using Notches to Uncover Optimization Frictions and Structural Elasticities: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(2), pages 669-723.
    19. Michael P. Devereux & Li Liu & Simon Loretz, 2014. "The Elasticity of Corporate Taxable Income: New Evidence from UK Tax Records," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 19-53, May.
    20. Yaniv, Gideon, 1988. "Withholding and non-withheld tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 183-204, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel, 2016. "Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Hernández Martínez, Pedro Jesús, 2016. "Reassessing the link between firm size and exports," Economics Discussion Papers 2016-25, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Sören M. Bergner & Jost H. Heckemeyer, 2017. "Simplified Tax Accounting and the Choice of Legal Form," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(3), pages 581-601, July.
    4. Joerg Paetzold, 2019. "How do taxpayers respond to a large kink? Evidence on earnings and deduction behavior from Austria," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(1), pages 167-197, February.
    5. Pedro J. Hernández, 2020. "Reassessing the link between firm size and exports," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 10(2), pages 207-223, June.
    6. Miguel Almunia & David Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018. "Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 1-38, February.
    7. Joan Vilá, 2019. "Respuestas en los ingresos frente a un programa de transferencias monetarias: evidencia de un notch a partir de registros administrativos de Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 19-07, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    8. Tazhitdinova, Alisa, 2015. "Reducing Evasion Through Self-Reporting: Theory and Evidence from Charitable Contributions," MPRA Paper 81612, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2017.
    9. Laurent Bach, 2015. "Do better entrepreneurs avoid more taxes?," Working Papers 1517, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    10. Li Liu & Ben Lockwood, 2015. "VAT notches," Working Papers 1506, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    11. Asatryan, Zareh & Peichl, Andreas, 2016. "Responses of firms to tax, administrative and accounting rules: Evidence from Armenia," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-065, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    12. Slemrod, Joel & Collins, Brett & Hoopes, Jeffrey L. & Reck, Daniel & Sebastiani, Michael, 2017. "Does credit-card information reporting improve small-business tax compliance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 1-19.
    13. Oronde Small & Leanora Brown, 2020. "Taxpayer Service Provision and Tax Compliance: Evidence for Large Taxpayers in Jamaica," Public Finance Review, , vol. 48(2), pages 250-277, March.
    14. Rico Belda, Paz & Cabrer-Borrás, Bernardí, 2021. "La importancia de los factores internos y externos en el éxito empresarial || The importance of internal and external factors in business success," Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa = Journal of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, vol. 32(1), pages 241-256, December.
    15. Rauhanen, Timo & Harju, Jarkko & Matikka, Tuomas, 2016. "The effects of size-based regulation on small firms: evidence from VAT threshold," Working Papers 75, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    16. Rrumbullaku, Oltion, 2021. "Firms behavior around tax thresholds in Albania during the 2015 anti-informality campaign - Bunching features, persistence and growth implications," MPRA Paper 112524, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Du, Pengcheng & Zheng, Yi & Wang, Shuxun, 2022. "The minimum wage and the financialization of firms: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Miguel Almunia & David Lopez-Rodriguez, 2018. "Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 1-38, February.
    2. Waseem, Mazhar, 2018. "Taxes, informality and income shifting: Evidence from a recent Pakistani tax reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 41-77.
    3. Almunia, Miguel & Lopez-Rodriguez, David, 2012. "The efficiency cost of tax enforcement: evidence from a panel of spanish firms," MPRA Paper 44153, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Kleven, Henrik & Best, Michael & Spinnewijn, Johannes & Waseem, Mazhar & Brockmeyer, Anne, 2013. "Production vs Revenue Efficiency With Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence From Pakistan," CEPR Discussion Papers 9717, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Michael Carlos Best & Anne Brockmeyer & Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Johannes Spinnewijn & Mazhar Waseem, 2015. "Production versus Revenue Efficiency with Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(6), pages 1311-1355.
    6. Irene Di Marzio & Sauro Mocetti & Enrico Rubolino, 2024. "The market externalities of tax evasion," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1467, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    7. Brockmeyer,Anne & Hernandez,Marco, 2016. "Taxation, information, and withholding : evidence from Costa Rica," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7600, The World Bank.
    8. Dina Pomeranz & José Vila-Belda, 2019. "Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 755-781, August.
    9. Annette Alstadsæter & Wojciech Kopczuk & Kjetil Telle, 2019. "Social networks and tax avoidance: evidence from a well-defined Norwegian tax shelter," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(6), pages 1291-1328, December.
    10. Todd Kumler & Eric Verhoogen & Judith Frías, 2020. "Enlisting Employees in Improving Payroll Tax Compliance: Evidence from Mexico," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(5), pages 881-896, December.
    11. Marcelo Bergolo & Gabriel Burdin & Mauricio De Rosa & Matias Giaccobasso & Martín Leites, 2019. "Tax bunching at the Kink in the Presence of Low Capacity of Enforcement: Evidence From Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 19-05, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    12. Paetzold, Jörg & Winner, Hannes, 2016. "Taking the high road? Compliance with commuter tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-14.
    13. Joel Slemrod & Obeid Ur Rehman & Mazhar Waseem, 2019. "Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from Pakistan," NBER Working Papers 25623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Einav, Liran & Finkelstein, Amy & Schrimpf, Paul, 2017. "Bunching at the kink: Implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 27-40.
    15. Philippe Aghion & Maxime Gravoueille & Matthieu Lequien & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2017. "Tax Simplicity or Simplicity of Evasion? Evidence from Self-Employment Taxes in France," NBER Working Papers 24049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Asatryan, Zareh & Peichl, Andreas, 2016. "Responses of firms to tax, administrative and accounting rules: Evidence from Armenia," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-065, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    17. Takafumi Suzuki, 2023. "Bunching Estimation and Its Theoretical and Empirical Progress," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 19(4), pages 1-25, October.
    18. Bohne, Albrecht & Nimczik, Jan Sebastian, 2018. "Information Frictions and Learning Dynamics: Evidence from Tax Avoidance in Ecuador," IZA Discussion Papers 11536, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Rubolino, Enrico, 2023. "Does weak enforcement deter tax progressivity?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).
    20. Carrillo, Paul & Emran, M. Shahe, 2018. "Loss Aversion, Transaction Costs, or Audit Trigger? Learning about Corporate Tax Compliance from a Policy Experiment with Withholding Regime," MPRA Paper 87445, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax enforcement; firms; bunching; Spain; Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU).;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:btx:wpaper:1412. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Dongxian Guo (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sbsoxuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.