Does credit-card information reporting improve small-business tax compliance?
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- Joel Slemrod & Brett Collins & Jeffrey Hoopes & Daniel Reck & Michael Sebastiani, 2015. "Does Credit-card Information Reporting Improve Small-business Tax Compliance?," NBER Working Papers 21412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
KeywordsTax evasion; Information reporting; Small businesses; Tax enforcement; Administrative data;
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
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